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Abstract/Foreword 
This dissertation consists of two essays which explore the interface between retail banks and organized 
criminality. In the first of these, “Dark Banking? Banks and Illicit Financial Flows from the Mexican 
Drug Trade,” I explore why banks provide financial services to organized-crime syndicates. I also ask 
whether there is a role for regulation in insulating finance from criminal activity. I address these 
questions using evidence from the drug trade in Mexico, finding that local drug cartel activity causes 
an increase in bank deposits, and branch networks grow in affected areas. After the election of a “law-
and-order” government, these effects dissipate, with liquidity flowing into branches of U.S. banks 
along the border.  
In the second essay, “Bank Branch Networks, Banking Relationships, and Organized Crime,” I explore 
if banks develop relationships with criminal organizations, exploiting spatial variation in cartel 
activity, again using Mexico as an empirical laboratory. I test whether banks with prior exposure to 
criminal activity are more likely to enter areas where cartels operate, as well as whether previous 
exposure to specific cartels predicts entry into banking markets where said cartels have entered. 
Results suggest that certain banks do establish these relationships. Bank characteristics that have 
significant effects on differential behavior regarding collusion with organized criminal organizations 
are domestic majority equity ownership and bank size. 
 
JEL Codes: G210, K42 
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Do banks enable crime? Does regulation insulate finance from criminal activity? I address these 
questions using evidence from the drug trade in Mexico, finding that local drug cartel activity causes 
an increase in bank deposits. Accordingly, branch networks grow in affected areas; this growth is not 
driven by increased lending opportunities. After the election of a “law-and-order” government, these 
effects dissipate, with liquidity flowing into branches of U.S. banks along the border. I interpret this 
as evidence that “finance follows crime” in weak institutional environments, and that, absent 






Mexican drug cartels are the largest foreign suppliers of heroin, methamphetamines, and 
cocaine to the U.S. market. In consequence, these cartels hold a significant market share of 
the worldwide illicit drug trade, which has been estimated at 1.5% of global GDP (UNODC, 
2011), and has the U.S. as its primary demand market. Apart from welfare considerations, 
these figures are enough to render the U.S.-Mexico cross-border drug trade of significant 
economic importance. However, we know little about the financial operations of this illicit 
industry. In truth, the finance literature is generally all but silent on phenomena like money 
laundering and the transmission of illicit financial flows. 
Do banks enable the transmission of illegal liquidity, or serve as an essential tool in the 
financial management of illicit “firms?” Alternatively, do they passively profit from illicit cash 
flows? Do regulation and regulatory enforcement succeed in insulating financial 
intermediation from criminal activity? Answering these questions is of key importance from 
the point of view of financial stability.





In this paper, I shed light on these issues using the illegal drug trade in Mexico as an 
empirical laboratory. I find that –prior to 2006—cartel entry into Mexican municipalities 
causes a steep increase in bank deposits held locally. Accordingly, bank branch networks 
grow in areas with organized-crime presence, consistent with banks possessing private 
information regarding the financial dealings of criminal enterprises. However, importantly, 
lending drops in these localities, implying these liquidity windfalls were not used to expand 
local credit supply. After the election of a Federal administration in Mexico that cracks down 
on organized crime in 2006, these effects dissipate, and liquidity flows into branches of U.S. 
banks located along the Mexican border.  
These deposits are not only concentrated in the border region, but also appear to “mirror” 
cartel activity in Mexico: both distance to the border and distance to the geographic center of 
activity of drug cartels in Mexico predict deposits volume after 2006. Further, I find evidence 
that is consistent with banks trading off benefits of taking on this surge in business volume 
with its risks: deposits volume in border counties predicts enforcement actions at the bank 
level, but only after 2006. Lastly, I find that government actions against drug cartels 
engender political backlash in localities that benefit from liquidity windfalls: the 2006 level 
of deposits predicts the likelihood of incumbent loss in subsequent local elections in Mexican 
municipalities with organized-crime presence. 
These results suggest that heightened law-enforcement and anti-money laundering (AML) 
actions succeeded in driving away illicit cash flows from the Mexican financial system. 
However, they also suggest that these efforts failed in financially handicapping crime 
syndicates, who were able to shift their mode of financial operation to avoid these controls, 
and thus potential prosecution. These findings also have implications for policy: evidence 
suggests that increased regulatory stringency against criminal finance fails on two fronts. 
First, it is rendered moot by regulatory arbitrage (in the form of liquidity exports) given an 
absence of transnational coordination in banking regulation. Second, the political response it 
provokes may render it untenable as long-run policy. 
Mexico is an ideal laboratory to study interactions between banks and organized crime: it is 
an economy with a large and developed banking system, and it has seen a steep rise in drug 
trafficking activity in the past decades. Moreover, government crackdown on this activity has 




led to temporal variation in the ease of doing business for drug cartels operating in this 
country. A complementary empirical setting in this investigation is the American side of the 
U.S.-Mexico border. The border region is economically integrated, with large volumes of goods 
and capital flowing in both directions; further, economic conditions in Mexico have been 
shown to affect the regional economies of U.S. border cities (Hanson, 1996). 
There is significant circumstantial evidence regarding the dealings of Mexican drug cartels 
with banks. For instance, in 2012 the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) levied a fine of $1.9 
billion from HSBC in the wake of a highly public money laundering scandal (Protess & Silver-
Greenberg, 2012). This fine came in response to the alleged laundering by HSBC Mexico of 
around $880M for both the Sinaloa (Mexico) and Norte Del Valle (Colombia) drug cartels.1 
Although at the time the fine was a record sum for monetary damages garnished from a bank, 
it corresponded to only slightly over a month’s profits for HSBC Global Holdings. (BBC, 
2012). This penalty came only months after the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations issued a report documenting the systematic breach of AML policies by HSBC’s 
U.S. subsidiary, which at the time processed around $7 billion of transfers from its Mexican 
counterpart annually (U.S. Senate, 2012).2 
Are the above anecdotes surprising? Perhaps, as great efforts have been made since the 1980s 
to place safeguards on the financial systems of both the U.S. and Mexico to foil money 
laundering and illicit financial flows. In the U.S., ten different federal agencies are charged 
with the enforcement of eight federal statutes governing know-your-customer requirements 
and AML.3  The cost of AML compliance has been estimated at $25.3 billion annual for US 
banks (LexisNexis Risk Solutions, 2018). Even in Mexico, an environment of relative 
institutional weakness, AML requirements cost financial firms 3-8% of net income (Quinn, 
2013). Despite these exacting rules, money laundering remains massive in scale, in both 
 
 
1 United States Department of Justice Case 1:12-cr-00763-ILG Document 3-3, Filed 12/11/12. 
Attachment A: Statement of Facts. 
 
2 Further details of this case may be found in Appendix D. 
 
3 Bank Secrecy Act (1970), Money Laundering Control Act (1986), Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 
Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act (1992), Money Laundering Suppression Act (1994), Money 
Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act (1998), Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), and 
Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 




Mexico and the United States. In the former country, estimates place laundering above $10 
billion annual, over 1% of GDP (Angel, 2016). In the U.S., laundering volume surpasses $300 
billion per annum (U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 2015). 
Beyond money laundering, illicit cash flows must be rendered mobile to access their full 
liquidity potential. This cash must be infused into the financial system before, for instance, 
paying suppliers in remote regions or being wired to a tax haven for safekeeping. As the 
international payments system is largely built on bank infrastructure, banks are almost by 
necessity involved in the transmission of illicit financial flows, even unbeknownst to them. 
However, as a result of the inner workings of money laundering—which I explain at some 
length in section 2(c) of this paper—it is likely that banks facilitate an important fraction of 
laundering transactions per se. However, there is little understanding, as before mentioned, 
of bank behavior in the presence of organized crime. How do banks behave in the face of risks 
that criminal activity entails? Similarly, we lack credible estimates of the impact that AML 
regulations have on within-country bank outcomes, as well as on cross-border liquidity flows. 
In this paper, I exploit variation in the areas of operation of drug cartels and the stringency 
of law enforcement in Mexico to identify these questions.  
Main themes presented in subsequent sections of this paper are (i) testing if criminal activity 
produced “excess” liquidity at a local scale in Mexico; (ii) testing the impact of increased 
regulatory activity in Mexico on both local banking activity and liquidity flows into the U.S. 
and; (iii) testing the timing of shifts in this activity. 
This paper contributes to several research literatures. Like Peek & Rosengren (2000), 
Schnabl (2012), Cetorelli & Goldberg (2012), and Bruno & Shin (2014), it documents cross-
border liquidity transmission. However, in this paper, the shock experienced at the origin of 
the financial flows is not itself a liquidity event, but rather a shift in regulatory regime. In 
this sense, this paper provides evidence in favor of the hypothesis of “regulatory arbitrage 
through international bank flows” of Houston, Lin, & Ma (2012). This paper kicked off a rich 
literature on cross-border regulatory arbitrage in banking, but the papers that have followed 
it (Reinhardt & Sowerbutts, 2015; Berrospide et al., 2016; Boyer & Kempf, 2016; Frost, de 
Haan, & van Horen, 2017; Temesvary, 2018) focus almost exclusively on the avoidance of 
macroprudential regulation. This paper, in contrast, focuses on regulatory arbitrage meant 




to avoid operational regulation. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time this 
phenomenon has been addressed in the literature. 
This paper is also part of a growing “forensic economics” literature; Zitzewitz (2012) surveys 
this literature at length. Related strands of this wider literature are that which addresses 
the economic analysis of money laundering, the growing literature on the economic impact of 
the drug trade –particularly in the context of the Mexican economy—and research 
investigating the spatial propagation of criminality. 4  This paper contributes to these 
literatures by documenting the effects of the illicit drug trade on the nominal side of the 
economy. Lastly, this paper contributes to the literature on the enduring economic 
importance of retail banking. While Gilje (2019), Nguyen (2019), and others explore the credit 
effects of local bank presence, less has been written on the importance of branch networks 
from the point of view of banking institutions –as a channel for the receipt of deposits, a 
cheap source of funding.5 In fact, most papers dealing with noninterest sources of bank 
income (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010; DeYoung & Rice, 2004) stress their negative risk 
impacts, as the primary concern in the literature has been regarding income streams accrued 
through trading activities.6 
The work closest to this present paper is perhaps Slutzky, Villamizar-Villegas, & Williams 
(2019), which deals with the consequences of AML regulation in Colombia. However, the 
questions this paper addresses, and the conclusions it reaches are quite different. First, 
Slutzky et al. center on the credit effects caused by the introduction of AML regulation, 
 
 
4 Key papers in this literature include Masciandaro (1999) and Masciandaro et al. (2007), who provide 
theoretical contributions to the study of money laundering. Walker & Unger (2009) and Schneider (2013) take 
an empirical approach to studying laundering in Australia and a panel of OECD economies, respectively. 
Argentiero et al. (2008) straddle these approaches, calibrating a structural model to estimate the volume of 
money laundering in the Italian economy. 
 
Robles, Calderón, & Magaloni (2013) and Ríos (2008, 2016) explore the effects of the drug trade on the 
real economy in Mexico. Ben-Yishay & Pearlman (2013) investigate the drop in labor-market participation 
induced by drug-related violence in this same country. Dell (2015) provides a thorough study of drug-trafficking 
networks in Mexico; she has also researched the consequences on cartel-related violence caused by labor-market 
dislocations (Dell et al., 2018). A recent paper by Sobrino (2019) documents the impacts of external demand 
shocks in the guise of opioid-painkiller reformulations on patterns of drug-related violence in Mexico. 
5 Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2016) do stress the role of branch networks in integrating lending 
markets through within-bank liquidity transmission, but their focus is on credit outcomes, not on bank 
profitability. 
6 Köhler (2014) and Drechsler, Savov, & Schnabl (2018) are exceptions, in that they pose channels 
through which the deposit-taking function of banks might improve their risk-reward trade-off. 




through a liquidity-shock channel; on the other hand, I study (i) bank response to organized 
crime activity and; (ii) liquidity transmission brought about by the regulatory response to 
this activity. Moreover, Slutzky et al. contend that AML mechanisms in fact work, albeit 
producing financial dislocations. I, contrastingly, document that absent international policy 
coordination, the effects of AML constraints are ultimately undone through regulatory 
arbitrage, as agents seeking to infuse illegal proceeds into the financial system can perform 
needed transactions in demarcations with less onerous controls. What allows me to gain 
greater clarity regarding this point is my unique empirical setting(s), in which I observe 
variation in outcomes across an economically important international border –open to capital 
flows, but relatively closed to other factors of production. 
 
2 Institutional Context 
 
A. A brief timeline of the Mexican drug war 
i. Origins 
In 2000, Congress approved a massive aid package for Colombia; this Plan Colombia provided 
for annual expenditures of around $1.2 billion on military materiel for the South American 
nation (Mejía, 2015).7 The intent of this initiative was to shore up the efforts of the Colombian 
government against drug cartels and allied leftist guerrillas. The cartels had grown to be a 
threat to the Colombian state, and with guerrilla groups such as the FARC, had waged a 
campaign of terror against the government lasting over two decades.8 As the Plan tipped the 
scales in favor of the Colombian government, the nation’s drug economy shrank. From 2000 
to 2013, coca plantations decreased in area from 160,000 ha. to 48,000 ha., and the business 
volume of drug cultivation and trafficking activities in Colombia dropped from around $7.5 
 
 
7 The Plan also contemplated the deployment of U.S. Marines to Colombia, and earmarked funds for 
humanitarian aid and local infrastructure. Further detail is provided in Appendix D. 
8 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (Spanish: Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, or FARC–EP ) was the main Marxist guerrilla group 
involved in the Colombian armed conflict, which spanned 1964 to 2017, when a peace accord was signed under 
the auspices of President Juan Manuel Santos. 




billion in 2008 to $4.5 billion in 2013 in nominal terms (Mejía, ibid.). As the Colombian drug 
cartels waned, Mexican cartels thrived.9  
 
ii. The 2006 election and the Calderón administration 
The 2006 presidential election in Mexico was highly competitive. Two front-runners emerged 
leading up to the ballot: Felipe Calderón, the candidate of the right-wing PAN party, and 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador10, of the left-wing PRD. Running head-to-head in the polls, 
the candidates sought to gain an advantage; Calderón did so by emphasizing the law-and-
order angle of the PAN platform. Calling organized crime “a disease, a cancer that burrowed 
under our skin little by little,” (Pérez Silva & LeDuc, 2015) he vowed to “take back the streets, 
especially along the [U.S.] border.”11 
The Calderón administration (2006-2012) delivered on this promise once in office. Ten days 
after inauguration, the new government announced the deployment of ground troops, with 
strong police backing, into the state of Michoacán. (Ellingwood & Wilkinson, 2009). This 
“joint operation” was followed by similar efforts in other states. This sea change in the anti-
narcotics policy of the Mexican government ultimately failed in its objective of increasing 
public safety in Mexico. It did, however, result in the detention of over 120,000 individuals 
charged with involvement in the drug trade (El Universal, 2010), and the capture or killing 
of many drug bosses, including Osiel Cárdenas, leader of the Gulf Cartel (AP, 2010). 
At first, the sole focus of the Mexican government in this new “war on drugs” was on the 
seizure and destruction of cartel assets such as drug plantations and weaponry, as well as 
the capture of kingpins. Calderón et al. (2015) document the strategy of “beheading” cartels 
pursued by the PAN administration, which led to widespread splintering of crime syndicates. 
This led to geographic spillovers in organized crime activity, evident in Figure 2, which plots 
the number of municipalities in Mexico with drug cartel activity as identified by Coscia & 
 
 
9 Slutzky, Villamizar-Villegas, & Williams (2019) claim the Plan was ultimately unsuccessful and did 
not contribute to large-scale variation in the activity of Colombian drug cartels. This, however, is not the 
consensus view. 
10 López Obrador, also known by his initials AMLO, is the incumbent President of Mexico, having been 
elected in 2018 after two previously unsuccessful bids for office. 
11 Op. Cit. 
 




Ríos (2012). As the fight against the cartels wore on, however, the government began to focus 
also on undermining the financial capability of organized crime syndicates. The Calderón 
administration introduced several measures aimed at curbing money laundering and cash 
deposits –a critical component of the money laundering cycle. Namely, in 2008, two related 
restrictions were placed on peso-denominated deposits at retail banks. First, banks were 
required to disclose all deposit operations over MXN $25,000 to Mexican tax authorities. 12 
Second, cash deposits were subject to a levy of 2% of the amount in excess of this reporting 
threshold. These figures were later set, in 2009, at MXN $15,00013 and 3% respectively. In 
2010, another round of restrictions was imposed on banks, this time on dollar-denominated 
transactions. Deposits or foreign-exchange transactions totaling over USD $1,500 by a same 
party within a calendar month were forbidden, unless the depositor was an accountholder, 
in which case the limit was set at USD $4,000. Corporate bank customers were forbidden 
from holding deposit accounts, unless they were registered in a port of entry or along the 
United States border (Notimex, 2010). 
Mexico held presidential elections again in 2012; a major campaign issue was the violence 
that had plagued much of the Mexican territory for the prior six years, throughout the 
Calderón administration. The PRI party, which had previously governed Mexico for over 
seven decades as a de-facto state party, carried the election running on the platform of being 
“a party that knows how to govern and cares about security.”14 Indeed, PRI officials disclosed 
to U.S. diplomatic officers in confidential settings that although they acknowledged “previous 
PRI governments [as] corrupt, at least they governed strongly and securely.” In 2014, the 
PRI government of President Peña Nieto repealed both peso- and dollar-deposit restrictions 
put in place by the Calderón administration. 
 
B. The Mexican banking system 
 
 
12 Around USD $2,200 at the mean MXN/USD exchange rate for 2008. 
13 Around USD $1,300 at the mean contemporaneous exchange rate. 
14 Leaked diplomatic cable communication (“Impact of a PRI Congressional Majority: The Math, the 
Substance, the Symbolism”), U.S. Embassy in Mexico to Department of Commerce, DHS, and diverse Federal 
agencies (March 3, 2009). Canonical ID: 09MEXICO604_a. Available at 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MEXICO604_a.html. 
 




Mexico has a bank-dominated financial system. In 2015, for reference, financial assets were 
around 90% of GDP, and over half of these were held by banks. Concentration is high in the 
Mexican banking market, with the seven largest market players accounting for almost two 
thirds of all bank assets.  
After the 1994-1995 Tequila Crisis, Mexican banks faced significant distress, with over 50% 
of total bank loans non-performing by 1996 (Haber & Musacchio, 2013). Faced with an 
immediate need for fresh capital, Mexican bank authorities sold off several bailed-out banks 
to international banking groups. This led to a significant portion of the Mexican banking 
system coming under the control of foreign banks: of the seven largest banks in Mexico, five 
are subsidiaries of multinational banking corporations. Banks in Mexico operate almost 
entirely at national scale.  
 
C. Money laundering and illicit financial flows 
Money laundering is an essential component of illicit economic activity. By “money 
laundering,” in this paper I mean the set of procedures by which funds derived from illegal 
activities are hidden from authorities and placed into the financial system. There are three 
stages in money laundering: placement, layering, and integration. In the placement phase, 
cash is incorporated into the financial system, typically either through the purchase of 
financial assets, or through deposit at retail banks. The layering phase is that in which the 
origin of the funds is obscured, to avoid detection by tax and law-enforcement authorities. 
Finally, in the integration phase, the newly “clean” funds are transferred back to the criminal 
organization, or to suppliers in payment for goods bought and services rendered. 
Although a variety of mechanisms underpin illicit financial flows (trade mis-invoicing, wire 
transfers, etc.), illicit activity that produces large volumes of cash profits must rely on 
methods allowing for the transfer of liquidity at scale.15 The preferred method of Mexican 
 
 
15 Why not simply wire money across the border? In the United States, outgoing wire transfers are 
monitored by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for possible transfer of funds to parties on the U.S. 
Treasury’s sanctions list. It is thus less risky for criminal groups to wire funds into the U.S. than out of the 
country. 




drug cartels for this purpose has been, historically, bulk cash smuggling.16 In bulk money 
smuggling as practiced by Mexican cartels, large volumes of cash or other monetary 
instruments –such as pre-paid debit cards—are first transported inside the U.S. from drug-
sale locations throughout the country to “consolidation cities,” metropolitan areas mainly in 
the Southwestern United States. Once concentrated and accounted for, proceeds are then 
moved to “deconsolidation cities” along the Mexican border such as Tucson, El Paso, and San 
Diego. In these cities, large cash shipments are divided into smaller volumes, and prepared 
for shipment across the border. Finally, cash is passed through into Mexico either by “mules” 
on private motor vehicles or stashed into tractor trailers transporting consumer goods across 
the border (United States Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2011).  
Once in Mexico, this cash must make its way into the financial system in order to be of use.17 
This entails two separate yet related transactions: first, money –in physical USD—must be 
exchanged for Mexican pesos (MXN). This operation may be performed through either a retail 
bank or a currency exchange bureau. Second, cash in MXN must be placed in a store of value. 
At times, this might be affected through assets such as precious metals or real estate, which 
typically have a purchase process involving relatively minor due diligence. Alternatively, 
funds may be directly deposited in a retail bank; this minimizes transaction costs, as both 
currency exchange and store-of-value transactions can be jointly performed. Given the lax 
client-facing controls extant in the Mexican banking system, this avenue for cash placement 
appears particularly attractive.18 Further, once funds have been placed within the Mexican 




16 Evidence of this, although circumstantial, was the seizure of close to $206 million in cash, allegedly 
connected with methamphetamine trafficking, by Mexican authorities in 2007. At the time, this was considered 
the largest drug cash seizure in global history (International Monetary Fund, 2008). 
 
17 This is mainly because Mexican cartels purchase a significant portion of their productive inputs in 
the United States. Thus, it becomes necessary for electronic payments to be made to suppliers abroad, which is 
only possible if cash from operations has been placed into the financial system. This is evident for the case of 
firearms: in 2016, the United States Government Accountability Office reported that around 70% of weapons 
seized in Mexico from 2009 to 2014 and traced by the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives (ATF) were identified as purchased in the U.S. (GAO, 2016). 
18 In FY2018, the Mexican ministry of Finance investigated around 124,000 individuals for suspicious 
financial activity. Of these, 14 were sanctioned, for a likelihood of sanction of about 0.01% (Ureste, 2018). 





D. Effects of increased AML stringency on illicit profit repatriation 
In the wake of the efforts of the Calderón administration to curtail the drug trade, large 
volumes of cash ostensibly related to money laundering began to flow into the financial 
system of the United States.19 As the restrictions on cash deposits took effect in Mexico, both 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FINCEN) issued bulletin alerts to U.S. financial institutions, anticipating that 
Mexican customers might “seek new relationships with U.S. financial institutions.” 20 
Banking authorities cautioned that although “the transactional activity that U.S. financial 
institutions may experience as a result of the new Mexican restrictions may not be indicative 
of criminal activity,” banks should strengthen AML mechanisms to stay in compliance of the 
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). 21  In sum, U.S. banking authorities expected money laundering and 
profit-repatriation mechanisms to shift away from bulk-cash smuggling, to rely on direct 




I use a variety of data sources in this paper. Data on financial and operational variables for 
Mexican banks comes from CNBV, the Mexican bank regulator. This data includes number 
of credit card contracts outstanding, deposits volume, and number of branches by bank and 
municipality, and is available at monthly frequency from 1995 to the present. I collect bank-
specific year-end reports containing this data and merge them to form an (unbalanced) panel 
spanning 1995 to 2010. I merge this data with data obtained from Coscia & Rios (2012), who 
 
 
19 Nevaer (2012) reports upwards of $1 trillion but provides no data in support of this claim. 
20 FINCEN Advisory Information Bulletin (FIN-2010-a007), Issued Date: June 21, 2010. Subject: Newly 
Released Mexican Regulations Imposing Restrictions on Mexican Banks for Transactions in U.S. Currency. 
21 OCC Bulletin 2010-28. (July 22, 2010). Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-money Laundering: Regulations 
Imposing Restrictions on Mexican Banks for Transactions in U.S. Currency. Retrieved from 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2010/bulletin-2010-28.html. 




construct a novel database on areas of drug-cartel activity in Mexico for a sample period 
spanning 1990-2010.22  
Further detail on the measure constructed by Coscia and Ríos can be found in Appendix A.23 
In short, however, this data is obtained from news-media coverage of organized-crime 
activity: Coscia and Ríos use a web crawler to query the Google News archive, searching for 
the co-occurrence of municipality names and words within a corpus of terms known ex-post 
to be associated with criminal organizations. This allows them to track the local presence of 
seven “cartel families” for a period spanning 1990-2010. 
Although this media coverage undoubtedly reflects violence exerted by cartels, it also 
manifests overt communications on behalf of organized crime syndicates. Phillips & Ríos 
(2019) document how cartels often –surprisingly—make their presence known in areas in 
which they operate, through “billboards, graffiti, banners, […] statements to the news media 
and [web content]” (Phillips & Ríos, op. cit.). This is especially prevalent in areas where 
incumbent crime syndicates face competitive entry. 
Data on U.S. bank deposits, as well as geolocation data for bank branches, comes from 
Summary of Deposits reports provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
while data on U.S. bank financials is from the Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) 
provided by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). Data on 
regulatory enforcement actions is obtained from the websites of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Data on drug seizures is from U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (USCBP), which reports the annual volume of cannabis and cocaine 
seized at each of the land points of entry into the United States, including the 48 along the 
Mexican border, as well as seizures performed at checkpoints in the interior of the U.S.  Data 
 
 
22 Downloadable from Michele Coscia’s academic webpage: 
http://www.michelecoscia.com/?page_id=1032 
23 Mexico is a federal union of 31 states and a capital region, divided into 2,456 municipios, or 
municipalities. Municipios are roughly comparable to counties in the U.S. context, both in scale and in the scope 
of local governance. Regulatory bank reports are disaggregated at the municipio level, and the data of Coscia & 
Ríos has the municipality as the level of observation. All empirical analyses for Mexico in this paper are thus 
specified at the municipality level. 




on illicit drug prices is retrieved from a variety of sources, including the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC). 
Summary statistics for key variables are presented in Table 1. In Panel A, statistics on 
outcome variables and controls are presented for sampled municipalities in Mexico. Panel B 
contains summary statistics for the U.S. sample, at the bank branch level. Although the 
treatment sample (municipalities eventually treated) is quite different across several 
dimensions from the “never treated” sample for the case of Mexico, the identification strategy 
I follow ensures that many localities are used as both treatment units and controls. I expound 
on this point in the Empirical Strategy section of this paper. I also report results for 
treatment-on-the-treated (ToT) estimations of tests performed in this empirical setting in the 
upcoming Results section. Lastly, to further address concerns that selection might be driving 
the findings of this paper, I have run (untabulated) matched-sample tests for core results, 
with little qualitative impact. 
Figure 1 plots the spatiotemporal variation in drug-cartel presence in Mexican 
municipalities. As can be seen, a significant expansion of cartel presence took place from 1995 
to 2010. According to the measure of Coscia & Ríos, only around 1% of municipalities were 
treated in 1995, in stark contrast with the treatment rate of almost 29% calculated for 2010.24 
As the variation exploited is at the level of the municipality-year, a potential concern is that 
treatment be clustered in a few periods.25 To address this concern, I plot the net number of 
municipalities entering the treatment group in each year from 1990 to 2010 in Figure 2. 
Although there are spikes in entry around the years 2005 and 2008, it is apparent that there 
is a steady accrual of municipalities into the treatment group, particularly from 1995 onward, 
the relevant time sample for this paper.26 
 
 
24 This figure is at odds with those calculated by the Mexican government: official data reported cartel 
activity in up to two-thirds of municipalities by 2008 (Dell, 2015). However, government data on local cartel 
presence is classified; also, it is likely to capture variation in drug-related violence, not the “productive” activity 
of criminal organizations. Phillips & Ríos (2019) document productive activities of drug cartels as a predictor of 
overt cartel communication. 
25 A municipality is coded as “treated” for year t iff the Coscia/Ríos data flags it as having cartel 
presence in that year, not so if was flagged in previous periods but not this one. In other words, municipalities 
can “drop out” of the treatment group. 
26 As before stated, the post-2006 spike is attributable to the “splintering” of already active crime 
syndicates. Cartel lieutenants not only vied for leadership of acephalous organizations, but also often carved out 
new areas of influence for successor cartels. 





4 Empirical strategy 
 
Several empirical challenges complicate testing the effects of organized crime on local 
banking outcomes. First, both affected and unaffected regions are exposed to common shocks 
such as business-cycle fluctuations. Hence, a naïve panel-regression analysis would not 
identify the causal impact of cartel activity on the variables of interest. Further, cartel 
presence might be endogenous to local characteristics, invariant or time varying. For 
instance, cartels might flock to “boomtowns,” i.e., locales with high economic growth or above-
average expectations of economic performance. Conversely, cartels might prey on poorer 
localities to take advantage of institutional weaknesses or attempt to corrupt local officials 
through bribes. Geographic conditions could also influence the attractiveness of a locality to 
criminal organizations. Mexican drug cartels are in essence logistics firms, and 
transportation costs affect their bottom line significantly.  
Lastly, “treatment” in this setting affects localities in a time-staggered manner. Hence, 
treatment periods will be location specific. A simple differences-in-differences estimation 
would hence not be appropriate to identify the causal impact of cartel activity on outcomes of 
interest. To deal with these issues, I pursue a generalized differences-in-differences (DiD) 
empirical strategy in the first part of this paper, which deals with the effects of drug-cartel 
activity on banking outcomes at a local scale. This method allows the treatment and control 
groups to be defined dynamically. In each period t, the treatment group consists of 
municipalities with cartel presence, and the control group of those in which no cartels are 
active. 
Likewise, testing the effectiveness of AML policy is not straightforward. Regulation —and its 
enforcement—are neither randomly assigned (save for special cases) nor arise in a vacuum. 
Rather, these tend to originate as a response to extant social phenomena as well as affect 
these, and thus their study is subject to the “reflection” problem identified by Manski (1993). 
To get around this problem, in the second part of this paper I run a series of canonical 
differences-in-differences tests to determine both the impact that a shift in the Mexican 
regulatory regime had on U.S. banking outcomes, such as deposits volume, and the 
endogenous response of banks to this shock. Since variation in drug-cartel activity and in 




Mexican regulation are arguably exogenous to banking activity in the U.S., I can isolate the 
causal effect of changes in the Mexican drug trade on banks in U.S. Border States. In this 






I first present results for a set of panel regressions of bank activity in Mexico on measures of 
organized-crime presence. These regressions are all specified at the municipality-year level. 




In equation (1), 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a (logged) outcome vector, with entries corresponding to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the 
number of credit-card contracts active in municipality i in year t, 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, total deposit 
volume in a given municipality-year, and 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the number of bank branches active in 
this municipality in year t. The model is fully saturated, with 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 being a municipality-specific 
fixed effect, and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 a year fixed effect. 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a binary variable which “turns on” if there 
are any cartels active in municipality i at time t27. The above specification is like the main 
ones in Jayaratne & Strahan (1996) or Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003).  
It is worth noting that this model may be estimated even if all localities are eventually treated 
during the sample period, as for every period t the control group will contain localities so far 
untreated. Results for these baseline regressions are presented in Table 2. For the preferred 
specifications (Column 1) of Panels A-C, cartel presence is found to have an impact of around 
 
 
27 The treatment indicator used is “contemporaneous” to the outcome variable. However, the data used 
in the construction of outcomes is obtained from end-of-year reporting, and treatment data contains a “natural” 
lag, due to publication delay. Hence, the lag structure of the expected treatment effect is replicated by the data. 
𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
 




29% on deposits, 12% on bank branches, and -17% on credit card lending. These results are 
robust to the inclusion of controls, which include (log) municipal population, unemployment 
rate, (log) number of homicides, and (log) annual municipal government expenditures, as is 
apparent in Column 2 of Panels A-C.28  
Results for deposits and branches are robust to the inclusion of (log) active credit card 
contracts as an additional control.29 This strengthens the contention that a treatment effect 
exists for these outcomes, independent of either endogenous lending growth, or a credit 
expansion driven by a prior growth in real economic activity.  
In Table 3, the results of ToT tests analogous to the ones mentioned above are reported. 
Directionally, the effect estimations obtained line up well with ATE estimates, although the 
magnitudes are somewhat muted. To account for possible nonlinear treatment effects, I also 
specify regressions with the following specification: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
 
In equation (2), 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a count variable tallying the number of drug cartels active in 
municipality i at time t. Results for this set of regressions are presented in Column (3) of 
Panels A-C of Table 2. As can be seen, previously estimated coefficients retain their sign, 
although their magnitudes change somewhat. The functional relationship between the 
different outcomes and criminality also seems to be idiosyncratic: while the effect on deposits 
is fully realized upon any level of cartel activity, the contraction of credit seems to accrue 
more slowly, and be virtually zero if only one cartel is active locally.  
A speculative explanation for this is that the real (licit) economy contracts upon the local 
entry of crime syndicates but is slow to do so. Although potential extorsion and the erosion of 
the rule of law seem prima facie sufficient to scare away investment, capital is not always 
 
 
28 Quantitatively, the result for branches is quite diminished upon the inclusion of controls. This might 
be due to sample attrition: one or more control variables is missing for around 2/3 of the sample, which biases 
the sample toward larger municipalities in these specifications.  
29 Results untabulated. 




mobile. In fact, Calderón et al (2015) find evidence consistent with this contraction only 
happening when competitive entry of new criminal groups produces violence. The relation 
between branches and cartel presence, lastly, appears to be approximately log linear. 
To address concerns that the above results might be driven by pre-trends, I present an 
analysis of coefficient dynamics in Figure 3. In these panels, the X-axis represents time 
around first treatment at the municipality level. As can be seen in these graphs, the 
estimated coefficients remain relatively flat prior to the onset of cartel activity, and present 
sharp increments around t = 0, the period of initial treatment. For both graphs, the omitted 
category is the pre-treatment period in excess of four years. These tests are performed on the 
treatment sample; to test more generally for the absence of pre-trends, I estimate models of 
the form 
 
𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝟙𝟙{𝒯𝒯 − 𝑘𝑘}𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3) 
 
In equation (3), 𝐶𝐶 = 𝒯𝒯 is the period of first treatment for municipality i, while 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘{1} ∪ {2}. 
Results for these estimations are presented in Table 4: pre-period dummies fail to load 
significantly in all specifications.30 
To address concerns regarding the potential endogeneity of treatment assignment, I run 
regression models with the following general specification: 
  
 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (4) 
 
where i indexes municipalities and t indexes years, and the contemporaneous municipal 
unemployment rate, (log) population, (log) municipal government expenditures, and the 
 
 
30 These graphs can also be thought of as representing “treatment on the treated” (ToT) treatment 
effects, due to the estimations that produce them having been run only on the treatment sample. This should 
further allay concerns regarding imbalance between treatment and control groups. 




“marginalization index” are included as explanatory variables, as proxies of local economic 
conditions.31  
Results for these models are presented in Table 5. As can be seen, local economic conditions 
do not seem to explain the contemporaneous local presence of drug cartels.  
It is of interest to determine whether increased law enforcement actions, or changes in 
regulatory stringency, could shift the estimated quasi-elasticities of these outcomes to 
criminal activity. Testing whether the law enforcement and AML actions of the Calderón 
administration had an effect is key to the goals of this paper. Particularly, it is relevant to 
determine whether the 2006 shock had by itself an effect on outcomes of interest. Further, it 
is pertinent to check for effects caused by policies enacted in 2008 and 2010. To test for these 
potential shifts, I run the following differences-in-differences specification: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝟙𝟙𝜏𝜏) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (5) 
 
for  𝒯𝒯 = {2006, … ,2010}. Results are presented in Table 6; I report estimations both on the 
entire sample (ATE), and on the treatment sample (ToT). For both specifications, a steep 
decline in the rate of deposits accumulation is discernible for 2006 in treated municipalities. 
In the ToT estimation, the 2006 decline all but erases the treatment effect, and subsequent 
years continue the decline. Results are less straightforward for the whole sample, yet it is 
quite clear that a significant dampening of the treatment effect occurs, irrespective of sample. 
 
B. United States 
The previous results indicate that the regulatory tightening brought about by the 2006 
election was a negative liquidity event for Mexican banks in treated localities. However, was 
 
 
31 The “marginalization index” (índice de marginación in the original Spanish) is a needs-based measure 
of poverty calculated annually by the Mexican government at the municipality level, using data from INEGI. In 
short, this index captures the first principal component in the variation of unmet necessities among municipal 
populations, in areas such as health, basic education, and housing (Ávila, 2001). 




this reversal caused by decreased business volume in the drug trade and associated 
laundering activity? 
In Figure 4, I plot supply- and demand-side factors related to the trans-border cannabis 
market, a microcosm of the larger illicit drug trade. As can be seen, seizures of shipments 
remained largely flat over the 2005-2013 period, with only a slight dip occurring around 2008. 
Although drug seizures at the border are a coarse measure of the extant business volume in 
the U.S.-Mexico drug market, this data confirms what is also apparent in Figure 2: there is 
no discernible drop in cartel activity around the 2006 election, nor immediately after. 
If production volume did not decline, and assuming no major price shocks, which is 
reasonable given the demand dynamics discernible from Figure 4, we are left with somewhat 
of a puzzle: where did this “missing” liquidity go?32 
Due to how illicit liquidity was infused into the financial system before this regulatory shock 
(i.e., through bulk dollar smuggling), it is a reasonable hypothesis that a portion of extant 
liquidity flows stopped making their way into Mexico and were instead deposited in U.S. 
banks. This hypothesis is also supported by anecdotal data. In the United States, law 
enforcement agencies, as well as financial regulators, issued memoranda warning about 
heightened money-laundering risks under the Calderón administration. Further, in 
Congressional Testimony, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel declared, 
after the last round of deposit restrictions had been imposed in Mexico: 
 
“[A] significant development […] has been a change in Mexican 
banking regulations that severely limits the amount of U.S. 
dollars that can be deposited [...] This […] has change[d] how 
drug proceeds are laundered. [There is] a desire to place these 
 
 
32 If anything, the proportion of the U.S. population reporting cannabis use during the previous month 
grew over this period. The same temporal pattern is observed during this period for other illicit drugs. 




funds into U.S. financial institutions and then wire the proceeds 
to Mexico…” 33 
 
I hypothesize, however, that the sequence of regulatory shocks starting in 2006 is the relevant 
“event” for liquidity transmission, and not the regulations or regulatory actions executed in 
any one year of the Calderón administration. The reason for this is dual: first, military actions 
against cartels ratcheted upward quickly starting in 2006. This means that the shift in the 
cost structure of cartels stemming from these actions was an abrupt level change around this 
year. Second, as counter-narcotics efforts were highly trumpeted by the government, it is 
likely that a change in expectations occurred with the election. Hence, I expect most of the 
treatment effect reversal to be realized immediately after the 2006 election, and smaller 
effects to occur with the imposition of AML measures in 2008 and 2010. I further expect an 
effect reversal to occur around 2012, when the PAN party was voted out in favor of the PRI, 
perceived as more lenient toward organized crime.  
To test for these hypothesized regulatory effects on cross-border liquidity flows, I estimate 
the following equation: 
 
 
𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝜏𝜏 × 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝒯𝒯
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (6) 
 
In the equation above, i indexes bank branches, while t indexes years. 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the 
shortest path between a branch i, represented as a latitude-longitude vector, and the set of 
points lying on the U.S.-Mexico border, while  𝒯𝒯 = {2006, 2012}.34 The inclusion of 2012 is to 
 
 
33 Testimony of U.S. ICE/Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent Matthew Allen to the House 
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security (May 21, 2012) 
 
 
34 More formally, the calculated distance is the minimal geodesic using the formula of Vincenty (1975), 
on an ellipsoidal model of the Earth. 




test whether a reversal in the 2006 shock was experienced once the law-and-order focused 
PAN government lost the Federal administration. The sample considered in this estimation 
is the set of all FDIC-insured bank branches located in one of the 24 counties in the United 
States that straddle the Mexican border.35 The sample period is 1995-2018. Results for this 
estimation are presented in Table 7.  
As can be seen in column (1) of this table, 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 loads negatively on (logged) deposits 
when interacted with a post-2006 dummy.36 More precisely, each one-hundred mile increase 
in branch distance to the border predicts around a 7% decrease in deposits after 2006. The 
interaction with a post-2012 dummy, however, yields a positive sign: a one-hundred-mile 
increase in branch distance to the border predicts around a 2% increase in deposits in column 
(3); this estimate is however not statistically significant. The pattern of temporal variation is 
quite clearly seen in Panel A of Figure 5: there is a sharp drop in the estimated coefficient 
around 2005-2006, with a further drop in 2007. After this latter year, there is a reversal in 
the estimated effect. 
It is unclear that the regression equation above captures the correct specification to gauge 
the effect of branch-level exposure to cartel activity on deposits. Considering this, for the sake 
of robustness, I specify two other sets of models using alternative exposure measures. For the 
first set, I proxy branch-level exposure with the least geodesic distance from bank branches 
to the geographic center of drug-cartel activity in Mexico. Details of the construction of this 
measure may be found in Appendix B.37 A graph of coefficient dynamics for regressions 
estimated using this measure is found in Figure 5 (Panel B). For the second set of regressions, 
I take a similar approach, using drug-seizure data to create a measure of branch exposure. 
Details of the construction of this measure are also included in the appendix. A plot of 
coefficient dynamics for regressions estimated using this measure is found in Figure 5 (Panel 
C). In sum, this metric is the distance of a branch to the nearest USCBP checkpoint, weighted 
 
 
35 These counties are San Diego and Imperial counties in CA; Yuma, Pima, Santa Cruz, and Cochise 
counties in AZ; Hidalgo, Luna, and Doña Ana counties in NM; El Paso, Hudspeth, Jeff Davis, Presidio, 
Brewster, Terrell, Val Verde, Kinney, Maverick, Webb, Zapata, Starr, Hidalgo, and Cameron counties in TX. 
36 “Post” dummies in all specifications “turn on” in the year of their index and continue taking a value 
of one for all years thereafter in the sample period. 
 
37 Henceforth, I refer to this measure as “distance-to-treatment.” 




at yearly frequency by the dollar value of seizures at this point. A graph illustrating this 
measure may be found in Appendix B. 
It is apparent from all three sets of regression estimations that the 2006 shock was a positive 
liquidity event for bank branches in counties contiguous to the Mexican border. However, is 
there evidence that this had any positive impact on bank financials? To test for this, I 
estimate equations with the following general form: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵�𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖� = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽1 �
∑ 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝟙𝟙{𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖}
∑ 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�+ 𝛽𝛽2�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶�+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 (7) 
 
In these regressions, i indexes counties, j indexes banks, and t sample-period years.38 The 
variable 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  in the third term of the expression above is shorthand for the ratio 
appearing inside parentheses in the second term of the equation. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is equal to the 
proportion of branches belonging to bank j in counties contiguous to the Mexico border, out 
of all branches in the United States. This measure is meant to proxy for the degree to which 
a bank’s business is dependent on Mexican customers –including, potentially, cartel 
operatives. Standard errors in these regressions are clustered at the bank level. 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 is a dummy variable that turns on in the period of interest (2006-2012) and 
zero otherwise. 
Table 8 reports the result of this set of tests. Although there is a small effect on profitability 
for the wider sample, effects are strongest for the interaction term 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ×
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 × 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖, where this last variable is a dummy that turns on for banks in 
the first two deciles of the per-year distribution of bank assets. 
These results make sense if one considers what a positive liquidity shock means for the 
financial condition of banks. Increased deposits –a cheap source of funding—lessen the 
necessity for interbank borrowing, depressing interest expense. This effect is only relevant 
for small banks, which may face financial constraints –not so for large banks, who many 
 
 
38 Interactions with size dummies are omitted from equation (7). 




times operate as dealers in the interbank market for funds. Another possibility is that 
smaller banks are more pliable to pressure from criminal syndicates, either because of the 
high fixed costs that AML mechanisms carry, or because of lower latent reputational risk. 
Because of the way these deposits are brought into banks and flow through them, it is also 
likely that an increased volume of transactions accompanied this positive liquidity shock. 
Indeed, the cycle of money laundering requires a multiplicity of transactions in both the 
placement and layering of illicit monies. This explains the positive effects on noninterest 
income reported in Table 8.  
Having obtained these results, the question becomes whether there is an endogenous bank-
branch network response to these liquidity shocks. To test for this, I run canonical 
differences-in-differences specifications of the following type: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵(𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝒯𝒯) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (8) 
 
In the above equation, 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is any of the distance measures introduced before: least 
geodesic distance to the Mexico border, “distance to treatment”, or “distance to seizure.” 
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of active bank branches for locality i in year t, and 𝒯𝒯 𝑘𝑘 {2006, 2012}. 
The sample considered in this regression is of all ZIP codes in counties on the southern 
border. As can be seen in Table 9, a 100-mile increase in distance from the border predicts a 
decline of around 3-5% in active bank branches after 2006.  
Untabulated tests of this effect at the county level yield a better interpretation of the 
economic significance this result: a one standard deviation increase in distance to the border 
would produce a net increase of around 11 branches in a county after 2006. Although this 
effect is not large in absolute terms, it must be considered within the wider trend of branch 
closures occurring in the U.S. during this period, shown in Figure 6.    
 
6 Further results 
 
A. Bank enforcement in the United States 




So far, I have shown that (i) there are detectable liquidity flows associated with the illicit 
drug trade; (ii) these flows are sensitive to regulatory stringency; and (iii) there are 
endogenous bank responses to these shifting capital flows. However, several potential 
concerns remain. For one, it may be that the cross-border flows extant after 2006 correspond 
to the flight of licit capital from Mexico, as violence ratcheted upward due to the onset of the 
Drug War. To rule this out, I test whether deposit receipts in border counties predict 
enforcement actions by bank regulators after 2006. More precisely, I estimate the equation  
 
𝟙𝟙{𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} = 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽�ln�𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵� × 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶2006�+ 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + {𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (9) 
 
where factorial terms for 𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) × 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶2006 have been omitted in Equation (9).39 
In the above equation, i indexes banks, and t indexes years. 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 is the quantity of 
deposits a bank holds in the 24 counties straddling the Mexican border, while 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is a bank 
fixed effect, and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 a set of year fixed effects. 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the within-sample asset decile bank i 
belongs to in year t, whereas 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a set of indicator variables for the principal 
regulator of bank i in this year: OCC, Federal Reserve, OTS, or FDIC. 
The sample considered for this test is of all banks with branches in AZ, CA, NM, and TX for 
the period spanning 1995-2017. Results for this estimation are presented in Table 10. 
Roughly, these results might be interpreted as follows: for every additional $50M of deposits 
in border counties, a bank was 1% more likely to receive an enforcement action (of any kind) 
from its primary regulator after 2006. Although this result in no way conclusively proves that 
these post-2006 liquidity flows were “dirty money,” it does strengthen the contention that 
banks were engaging in riskier transactional activity in the border region during this period. 
 
B. Electoral outcomes in Mexico 
 
 
39 Loadings for these factorials are, however, included in the table reporting results for this estimation. 




Another potential objection that could be raised regarding the results presented so far is that 
showing the presence of regulatory arbitrage is not tantamount to showing the failure of 
heightened AML enforcement. In a strict sense, we would need to observe a clear-cut 
counterfactual to gauge the impact of the observed policy shifts. To address this, I test 
whether the imposition of AML controls, together with heightened law enforcement, had any 
electoral impact in Mexico. More precisely, I estimate the regression equation 
 
𝟙𝟙{𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷}𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽�𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖2006 × 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶2006� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (10) 
 
where factorials for 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖2006 × 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶2006 have been omitted in Equation (10).40 
In this equation, i indexes municipalities and t indexes years, for a repeated cross-section of 
municipal elections spanning 2000-2017. Table 11 reports the results of linear probability 
and panel logistic-regression estimations of this model. Both models are saturated with 
municipality- and year fixed effects and contain party dummies for the three major political 
parties in Mexico during the sample period (PAN, PRI, PRD). I find that, among treated 
municipalities, the 2006 level of deposits positively predicts the probability of incumbent loss 
in post-2006 municipal elections. I interpret this finding as evidence of political backlash 
against government actions that compromised local liquidity windfalls.  
This finding is consistent with the view that post-2006 electoral politics in Mexico were 
increasingly centered around a referendum on the government’s anti-cartel policies, which 
may have led to the defeat of the ruling PAN party at the Federal level in 2012, and the 






40 For notational clarity. Coefficients for these terms are reported in Table 11. 







Banking is a heavily regulated economic activity the world over, as banks are critical to 
welfare through the allocation of capital, the support of a payments system, and the escrow 
of savings. Hence, legal norms disallow banks to engage in certain activities, to preserve 
financial stability and preempt the channeling of capital to antisocial activity. Despite these 
norms, however, banking institutions have a rich history of malfeasance. From the South Sea 
Bubble, to the excesses of the “Wildcat banking” era (Jackson & Kotlikoff, 2018) to the billions 
in fines and settlements paid for illegal lending practices by Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, and 
others in connection to the 2008 Financial Crisis (Kraakman, Soltes, & Hofstetter, 2018), 
there are numerous examples of intermediaries breaking laws and regulations meant to 
constrain them. Is there reason to think that this pattern of behavior is systemic? 
There is an ample literature that portrays banks as information producers. Starting with 
Fama (1985), a great deal of papers have documented the screening (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1988), 
monitoring (Houston & James, 1996), processing of “soft” information (Petersen & Rajan, 
1994), and efficient capital allocation (Beck & Levine, 2004) functions of banks. In short, the 
common conceptual thread in these works is this: the advantage that banks hold is their 
relative advantage in generating –and ultimately diffusing—information on the credit risk 
of borrowers. Hence, the key source of bank value is information revelation to the wider 
economy. 
A more recent strand of literature portrays banks, contrastingly, as “information garbling” 
mechanisms. Dang, Gorton, Holmström & Ordoñez (2017), for instance, paint banks as secret 
keepers. These authors claim that banks muddle information on the credit risk of debt claims 
they hold as assets. This allows for these claims to trade as “moneylike” securities (i.e., at 
face value), as it is costly for agents to produce information on their “true” discount. Jackson 
& Kotlikoff (2018) draw a link between this “secret keeping” function of banks and 
malfeasance in banking. In sum, these authors link historical banking crises to bank 
malfeasance: if banks are skilled at distorting information about the debt claims they hold, 
this generates the moral hazard of using this capacity for hiding outright graft, or other 
privately optimal illicit activity. 




This all pertains to the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, however. What about liabilities? 
The anecdotes on banks obscuring the origin of deposits they hold or helping structure 
mechanisms for the store of value that muddle the identity of depositors are numerous. Banks 
have been documented receiving deposits from illicit sources, channeling deposits to fiscal 
havens, and helping clients avoid taxation through obscuring their liquid wealth. However, 
we lack a rigorous understanding of whether banks systematically engage in these activities, 
and if so, why.  
Results obtained in this paper are consistent with banks acting as “potentially crooked secret 
keepers” (Jackson & Kotlikoff, op. cit.) In other words, the evidence presented may point to 
banks utilizing installed “opacity technology” gained through their “secret-keeping” function 
to optimize operations in a manner inaccessible to other economic agents. Banks can expose 
themselves to the risk of potential relationships with organized crime in order to secure cheap 
sources of liquidity. Anecdotes point to banks anticipating lenient penalties should this risk 
realize, and authorities crack down. Further research is needed, however, to disentangle the 
potential links between banking activity and the illicit sectors of the economy. 
However, if banks do in fact “enable” criminality, is this unambiguously welfare decreasing? 
It is far from clear that this is the case: there is no consensus view in the literature regarding 
the net effect that organized crime has on economic outcomes.  
A reasonable prior is that criminal activities have net negative economic effects, as they 
generate distortions that decrease the productivity of the licit economy and undermine 
government institutions through corruption. Money laundering, and the associated 
transmission of illicit financial flows, are no exception concerning potential negative impacts. 
Indeed, the infusion of criminal profits into the financial system might undermine the solidity 
of the financial sector through, for instance, reputational erosion. Money laundering might 
also cause negative impacts in the international trade and finance sectors, via distortions in 
the balance of payments. These impacts have been documented in previous research, like 
that of Kumar (2012) and Bartlett & Ballantine (2002). 
A case may be made that illicit activities can have a positive impact on economic growth, 
however –especially in developing economies—through liquidity spillovers that ultimately 
make their way into productive investment (Villa, Loayza, & Misas, 2017). However, money 




laundering per se quite likely leads to some measure of capital misallocation41, and once 
laundering is extant, there will be considerable costs associated with ending it. Geiger and 
Wuensch (2006), for instance, argue that a laissez-faire approach to money laundering might 
be optimal, since anti-money laundering regulations may be welfare-reducing, entailing 
stark costs of compliance. In fact, these authors argue, these costs risk becoming so onerous 
that the policy intent of anti-money laundering regulation backfires, leading to an 
equilibrium increase in money-laundering volume. 
Are there normative implications to be drawn from this paper? Surely so. However, its intent 
is not to allocate blame for criminal activity to financial intermediaries. Rather, the goal is 
to bring attention to the stark trade-offs implied by regulation and legal enforcement aimed 
at “securing” the financial sector from interactions with organized crime. These regulations 
are seldom questioned, yet carry significant costs, both direct –through compliance expense—
and indirect –through the liquidity channel established by Slutzky et al. (2018). Careful 
consideration should be given to the imposition of operational controls on financial 
intermediaries, weighing costs and benefits: this is especially true in the context of open 
financial systems, where the costs faced by agents seeking to circumvent these controls via 




In this paper, I have presented evidence that i. local drug-cartel activity leads to positive local 
liquidity shocks for banks, which respond endogenously by increasing their local footprint; ii. 
that regulatory tightening in law-enforcement and AML policy aimed at handicapping the 
activity of organized crime leads to cross-border liquidity flows; iii. that increased legal 
enforcement leads to political backlash in locales that have been benefited by liquidity 
windfalls generated by illicit economic activity. 
 
 
41 Bribes, kickbacks, and other “investments” needed to set up a money laundering mechanism might 
be thought of as purely transfers. However, they are also transactions costs from the viewpoint of a Walrasian 
planner: as endogenous entry into regulation is impossible, these costs will not be competed away, and remain 
in equilibrium. 




I document that local criminal presence leads to an expansion of the deposit base by around 
a third in Mexican municipalities. After 2006, when a law-and-order administration takes 
power, deposits flow into banks located along the Mexico border in the United States. These 
results are robust to a variety of empirical specifications. Importantly, I document that banks 
respond to these positive liquidity shocks by expanding their branch networks into regions 
exposed to criminal activity. 
In sum, “finance follows crime,” i.e. there is growth in both the extensive (branch network 
expansion) and intensive (deposit capture) margins of banking activity when criminal 
activity produces large liquidity windfalls. These findings have several implications. For one, 
banks –wittingly or unwittingly—enable the operation of organized crime. Second, deposits 
captured through retail branch networks matter. Banks are willing to enter areas rife with 
crime, and expose themselves to reputational hazards, to secure relatively cheap sources of 
funding. This suggests that banks actively trade off reputational and operational risks with 
funding needs.42  
Increased regulatory stringency, on the other hand, produces liquidity flows. Evidence 
presented herein shows that once the relative cost of depositing illicit cash flows was tilted 
in favor of the United States, deposits indeed flowed from Mexico, which had become 
relatively unattractive because of new deposit controls. This supports the hypothesis of cross-
border regulatory arbitrage of Houston, Lin, & Ma (2012).43   
Lastly, AML regulation likely fails in financially handicapping organized crime syndicates. 
Although the locus of liquidity spillovers from criminal activity shifts upon increased 
regulatory stringency in Mexico, there is no evidence that drug-cartel activity was reduced 
as a result. Increased controls on financial intermediation, do, however, produce political 
backlash. This is a clear example of a “race-to-the-bottom” regulatory dialectic, such as was 
 
 
42 Whether banks possess intent to collaborate with criminal activity in entering these areas is moot. It 
is highly unlikely that banks are oblivious to the presence of criminal activity at a local scale, especially when 
this activity has been documented in the media, which is a necessary condition for a locality to be coded as 
treated in the first part of this paper. That banks willingly face risks in entering areas of criminal activity is fait 
accompli.  
43 Although Houston et al. document a slightly different channel, in which banks themselves redirect 
capital to lower-regulation polities, the economic effect of depositors or banks driving these liquidity flows is 
similar. 




hypothesized by Kane (1981), and brings into question the wider welfare effects of (perhaps 
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Figure 1. Geographic expansion of drug-cartel activity in Mexico 
This figure shows the spatiotemporal variation in drug-cartel activity in Mexico from 1995 to 2010. 
Areas in which at least one drug cartel is active are darkly shaded; light shading signifies no data 
available; no shading indicates no cartels active. Units of observation are municipios. Data for the 














Figure 2. Net entry of municipalities into treatment group, 1990-2010 
This figure plots the net number of municipalities entering the treatment group for years 1990 to 2010, 
according to the data presented in Coscia & Ríos (2012). Sample periods for analyses presented in this 

















Figure 3. Treatment effects on local banking activity, event time 
The graph below shows estimated coefficients for regression models with the specification 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝟙𝟙{𝐶𝐶 = 𝒯𝒯}𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , in which 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  is a municipality FE, and 𝒯𝒯 is the year around first cartel 
activity observed for municipality i: Year 0 is the first period in which each unit is treated. The models 
above are run only on the treatment group. Panel A shows effects on total deposits; Panel B shows 
effects on active bank branches. The omitted category is years in excess of five before first treatment. 
   
Panel A: Deposits 
 










Figure 4. Supply and demand factors, U.S. cannabis market 2005-2018 
The figure below graphs the time variation in cannabis seizures by weight (lbs./agent) performed by 
the United States Customs and Border patrol from 2005 to 2018 and the percentage of the U.S. 
population reporting any cannabis use of the month prior for the same period. Also graphed are extant 
miles of border fencing on the U.S.-Mexico border, also for 2005-2018, and the number of states with 

















Figure 5. Coefficient dynamics, distance-to-border regressions 
This set of figures shows estimated coefficients of interest for a set of regressions with the following 
general specification: 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝜏𝜏) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
In these regressions, τ takes values in the sequence [2000, 2001, … , 2014]. Each value of τ defines a 
regression estimation, and the calculated coefficient of interest for interest is plotted, together with its 
standard error. The years 1995-1999 are excluded from the exercise, although they form part of the 
estimation sample for the regression analyses presented elsewhere in the text. The reason for this is 
that the NAFTA came into effect on January 1, 1994 and had deep impacts on capital flows among 
North American nations. Hence, the early years in the sample period considered do not constitute an 
adequate “control” for the subsequent period. In Panel A above, 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the least geodesic 
distance from a bank branch to the Mexican border. In Panel B, 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the “distance-to-




















The figure above plots active bank branches and total bank deposits for the 1997-2017 period in the 
United States. Up to around 2007, both series covary closely, but this covariance breaks down 
thereafter, with the number of bank branches experiencing a slight decline over the next ten years. 
 
 




Table 1.  Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of outcome variables and covariates for observational units in both empirical settings used in 
this paper. Panel A contains data for Mexico, at the municipality-year level. Panel B contains U.S. data, at the branch-year level. 
 
Panel A: Mexico, municipality level 
 
 
Panel B: United States, bank branch level 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Bank branches 12,895 6 21 6,190 11 30 6,705 1 2
Credit card contracts (count) 13,286 9,798 60,099 6,453 19,262 85,133 6,833 861 3,795
Deposits (total: MXN, Millions) 12,978 990 5,090 6,284 1,760 6,800 6,694 269 2,410
Demand deposits (MXN, Millions) 12,978 562 2,640 6,284 995 3,440 6,694 156 1,450
Term deposits (MXN, Millions) 12,978 428 2,760 6,284 765 3,800 6,694 113 994
Population 11,904 37,572 43,109 5,235 58,837 51,517 6,669 20,879 24,501
Unemployment rate (%) 10,334 2.97% 2.34% 5,373 2.88% 1.78% 4,961 3.07% 2.82%
Homicides 11,904 5 9 5,235 8 12 6,669 2 4
Gov't expenditure (municipal) 10,866 85 116 5,046 127 148 5,820 50 56
Full sample Treatment sample Control sample (never treated)
Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Metropolitan area dummy 30,594 0.952
Micropolitan area dummy 30,594 0.038
Distance from U.S.-Mexico border 30,396 42.936 82.973
(miles)
"Distance to seizure" 27,879 627.514 132.974
(miles, weighted)
"Distance to treatment" 17,163 972.697 371.143
(miles)
Deposits 30,594 71,548 164,195
(USD, thousands)




Table 2. Treatment effects on local banking outcomes, Mexico 
The table below shows estimated coefficients for regressions of (Panel A) (logged) bank deposits, 
(Panel B) (logged) number of bank branches, and (Panel C) local lending (as proxied by the log 
number of active credit card contracts), on treatment measures. Binary treatment measures appear in 
columns (1)-(2) and binary/continuous measures in column (3), respectively. These regressions also 
contain full batteries of municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects/control variables (year FE 
only: columns (1) and (3), year effects and controls: column (2)). Control variables included are (log) 
municipal population, unemployment rate, (log) number of homicides, and (log) annual municipal 
government expenditures. In untabulated regressions, (log) active credit card contracts is included as 
an additional control, with results remaining qualitatively unchanged. These regressions cover a 
















Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No
Observations 12,978 9,038 12,978
R-squared 0.323 0.398 0.323
Number of clusters (municipalities) 2,379 2,240 2,379
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(Deposits)
(1) (2) (3)




Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No
Observations 13,286 9,218 13,286
R-squared 0.639 0.671 0.641
Number of clusters (municipalities) 2,416 2,276 2,416
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(Credit cards)








Table 3. Treatment-on-the-treated effects on local banking outcomes, Mexico 
The table below shows estimated coefficients for regressions of (logged) bank deposits, (logged) number 
of bank branches, and local lending (as proxied by the log number of active credit card contracts), on 
treatment measures. These regressions are run exclusively on the “assigned-to-treatment” subsample, 
and contain full batteries of municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects/control variables (year 
FE only: columns (1), (3), and (5); year effects and controls: columns (2), (4), and (6)). Control variables 
included are (log) municipal population, unemployment rate, (log) number of homicides, and (log) 
annual municipal government expenditures. In untabulated regressions, (log) active credit card 
contracts is included as an additional control, with results remaining qualitatively unchanged. All 













Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No
Observations 12,895 8,851 12,895
R-squared 0.513 0.442 0.520
Number of clusters (municipalities) 2,416 2,276 2,416
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(Branches)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.138* 0.179** 0.033** 0.026* 0.059 -0.036
(0.072) (0.085) (0.015) (0.016) (0.080) (0.091)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 6,284 4,234 6,190 4,083 6,453 4,328
R-squared 0.484 0.523 0.595 0.518 0.692 0.707
Number of clusters (municipalities) 717 623 737 642 737 642
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(Deposits) ln(Credit cards)ln(Branches)





Table 4. Trend analysis, Mexico 
This table presents results of regressions of logged outcomes on a treatment dummy (Column (1)), and 
this dummy with: (i) a dummy which turns on in years -1 and -2 around first treatment and is zero for 
every other year (Column (2)); (ii) a dummy which turns on only in year -1 (Column (3)); and (iii) a 
dummy which turns on only in year -2 (Column (4)), respectively. Panel A contains results for deposits, 











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated 0.287*** 0.319*** 0.310*** 0.292***
(0.088) (0.098) (0.092) (0.091)
Pre-period dummy (t = -1 OR t = -2) 0.077
(0.059)
Pre-period dummy (t = -1) 0.085
(0.077)
Pre-period dummy (t = -2) 0.033
(0.052)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,978 12,978 12,978 12,978
R-squared 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323
Number of code 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(Deposits)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.117***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017)
Pre-period dummy (t = -1 OR t = -2) 0.013
(0.019)
Pre-period dummy (t = -1) 0.020
(0.019)
Pre-period dummy (t = -2) -0.000
(0.015)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,895 12,895 12,895 12,895
R-squared 0.513 0.513 0.513 0.513
Number of code 2,416 2,416 2,416 2,416
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(Branches)








Table 5. Municipal characteristics and cartel presence 
This table presents results for estimations of regression models with the general specification  
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, where i indexes municipalities and t indexes years. In Column (2), the 
binary variable 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is replaced with the continuous measure of treatment 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , a count 
variable which registers the number of cartels active in municipality i for year t. Both models reported 
contain a full set of municipality- and year fixed effects. The unit of observation is the municipality-
year; standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated -0.171** -0.171* -0.179* -0.167**
(0.082) (0.096) (0.091) (0.083)
Pre-period dummy (t = -1 OR t = -2) -0.001
(0.091)
Pre-period dummy (t = -1) -0.030
(0.093)
Pre-period dummy (t = -2) 0.030
(0.083)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,286 13,286 13,286 13,286
R-squared 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.639
Number of clusters (municipalities) 2,416 2,416 2,416 2,416
Robust standard errors in parentheses




"Marginalization index" -0.007 -0.014
(0.006) (0.012)
ln(Gov't expenditure) 0.011 0.012
(0.010) (0.018)




Municipality FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 8,355 8,355
R-squared 0.330 0.319
Number of code 2,185 2,185
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Table 6. Treatment effect dynamics 
This table reports coefficients for estimations of the equation  𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝟙𝟙𝜏𝜏) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for  𝒯𝒯 =
{2006, … ,2009} . Column (1) reports average treatment effect (ATE) coefficients, while Column (2) reports ToT 
estimates. Both models contain municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality 





Treated ×  2006 -0.123** -0.179***
(0.061) (0.062)
Treated × 2007 -0.042 -0.008
(0.082) (0.118)
Treated × 2008 0.240 -0.185
(0.211) (0.210)
Treated × 2009 0.217 -0.120
(0.195) (0.261)
Treated × 2010 0.375* 0.173
(0.192) (0.308)
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 12,978 6,284
R-squared 0.324 0.485
Number of clusters (municipalities) 2,379 717
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(Deposits)




Table 7. Differences-in-differences regressions, bank deposits in border counties (U.S.) 
This table shows estimated coefficients for differences-in-differences regressions of (logged) bank deposits on the interaction of a measure of 
distance and post-2006, and post-2012 indicator variables (and corresponding factorial terms). The models presented are fully saturated with 
a full set of branch and year fixed effects. The unit of observation in these models is the branch; standard errors are clustered at this level. 
Although the coefficient on 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is not in a strict sense identified, year-to-year changes in the physical location of branches introduces 
slight time variation in this (cross-sectional) variable. Branches retain their unique identifier even when their street address changes due to 
bank commercial strategy or acquisition by a different banking institution. 
(1) (2) (3)
Distance 0.046 0.026 0.047
(0.070) (0.070) (0.069)
Post-2006 × Distance -0.068*** -0.076***
(0.024) (0.023)
Post-2012  × Distance 0.001 0.024
(0.019) (0.017)
Branch FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,713 5,713 3,342
R-squared 0.147 0.147 0.147
Number of clusters (branches) 312 312 309
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(Deposits)




Table 8. Differences-in-differences, bank-level profitability (U.S.) 
 
 
The table above shows estimated coefficients for differences-in-differences regressions of a vector of (logged) indicators of bank-level 
profitability on the interaction of a measure of bank exposure to drug-cartel activity and 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, an indicator variable which turns 
on post-2006 and off again post-2012 (and corresponding factorial terms). The measure of exposure used is the fraction of branches for a 
banking institution that lie within counties straddling the Mexican border, as a proportion of all branches in the U.S. The models presented 
are fully saturated with a full set of bank and year fixed effects. The unit of observation in these models is the bank; standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level. 
 
 








Exposure 0.890*** -0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.314) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003)
Exposure x Treatment period -0.167 0.005*** 0.001 -0.002
(0.112) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Small 0.192 -0.006 0.001 -0.001
(0.305) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Small x Exposure -1.159*** -0.004 -0.002 -0.000
(0.386) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Small x Treatment period -1.074* -0.018** 0.006** -0.003
(0.603) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Small x Exposure x Treatment period 1.185* 0.020** -0.008** 0.005*
(0.626) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,062 2,062 2,062 2,062
R-squared 0.273 0.280 0.896 0.357
Number of clusters (banks) 234 234 234 234
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Table 9. Differences-in-differences, active bank branches in border counties 
The table below shows estimated coefficients for differences-in-differences regressions of the (log) number of active bank branches on the 
interaction of a measure of distance and a vector of indicator variables that “turn on” in 2006 and 2012, respectively. The models reported 
above contain also corresponding factorial terms. The models are fully saturated with a full set of county and year fixed effects. The unit of 
observation in these models is the ZIP code-year; standard errors are clustered at the ZIP code level. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Measure: "Distance to treatment"
Distance 0.006 -0.099*** -0.099***
(0.006) (0.028) (0.028)
Post-2006 × Distance -0.047*** -0.037*** -0.016*** -0.029** -0.025**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011)
Post-2012  × Distance -0.019 -0.009
(0.012) (0.008)
ZIP Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,713 5,713 3,342 5,495 5,495
R-squared 0.116 0.117 0.137 0.129 0.130
Number of clusters (ZIP codes) 312 312 309 317 317
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(Branches)
Geodesic "Distance to seizure"
(Absorbed)




Table 10. Probability models, bank enforcement actions 1995-2017 
This table presents results for estimations of the equation  
𝟙𝟙{𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} = 𝛽𝛽�𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) × 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶2006� + 𝑿𝑿𝜃𝜃 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 where i indexes banks, and t indexes years. 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 is the quantity of 
deposits a bank holds in the 24 counties straddling the Mexican border; the sample considered for this test is of all banks with branches in 
AZ, CA, NM, and TX for the period spanning 1995-2017. Results in Column (1) are for a model with bank fixed effects; results in (2) are for a 
model with bank- and year fixed effects. Both models include regulator fixed effects, as well as a bank-asset decile control. 
 
(1) (2)















Bank FE Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes
Observations 19,725 19,725
R-squared 0.035 0.060
Number of clusters (banks) 2,138 2,138
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable:                     
Enforcement (binary)
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Table 11. Probability models, municipal election results, 2000-2017 
This table presents the results of estimations of the regression equation 
𝟙𝟙{𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷}𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖2006 × 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶2006) + 𝑿𝑿𝜃𝜃 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where i indexes municipalities and t indexes years, and X is a vector of factorial terms associated with 
the interaction term 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖2006 × 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶2006 , for a repeated cross-section of municipal 
elections spanning 2000-2017. Column (1) contains the results of a linear probability estimation, while 
Column (2) reports results of a panel logistic-regression estimation. Both models are saturated with 
municipality- and year fixed effects and contain party dummies for the three major political parties in 
Mexico during the sample period (PAN, PRI, PRD). The unit of observation is the municipality-year; 
reported standard errors are clustered at the municipality level for the LPM, and heteroscedasticity-















Estimation: LPM Panel logit
Treated 0.620 3.544
(0.808) (3.945)
Deposits, log 2006 level 0.124 0.871
(0.102) (0.872)
Treated × Deposits -0.031 -0.171
-0.038 (0.189)
Treated × Post-2006 -1.713* -9.651**
(0.901) (4.485)
Deposits × Post-2006 -0.063** -0.341**
(0.030) (0.153)





Number of clusters (municipalities) 544 373
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Incumbent voted out = 1




10  Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Cartel activity data 
 
Coscia & Ríos (2012) develop an algorithm to identify criminal organizations active in 
Mexican municipalities at yearly frequency, for a sample spanning 1990-2010. The algorithm 
of Coscia and Ríos queries a pre-defined set of 176 cartel and cartel-member names (“actor 
terms”), including aliases, in online news sources archived by Google News, using the API 
provided by Google for mass data retrieval, deprecated in late 2010. 
Then, the algorithm repeats this exercise with municipality names and place names 
associated with municipalities and tallies the co-occurrence of these terms with the “actor 
terms,” to construct a matrix of pairwise occurrence frequencies. When names are 
approximate or exact duplicates, auxiliary search terms are added to the municipality query 
to disambiguate results. 
To flag a municipality-year as “treated,” the algorithm then follows a sequence of steps. First, 
it calculates the probability of observing a given joint frequency by mere chance, using the 
hypergeometric probability distribution as the null model. More precisely, the following ratio 
is calculated (i.e. the hypergeometric probability mass function, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻). 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) =
�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖







where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is the calculated frequency of a given “actor term” within a municipality m, 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is the 
total number of hits obtained for this given “actor term,” 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is the total number of hits for 
municipality m, and ℳ is the total number of hits obtained, irrespective of set. Then, the 
cumulative probability of obtaining 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 or less results, (that is, the cumulative hypergeometric 
distribution function, 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) is calculated: 











Finally, a municipality-year is marked as “treated” if this cumulative probability exceeds an 
arbitrary threshold of 0.95. The final sample constructed by Coscia and Ríos contains 2,449 
municipalities and 176 “actor terms,” representing thirteen drug cartels, which are then 
aggregated into seven wider cartel “families,” and a residual category. 
To validate their measure, Coscia and Ríos perform two exercises: first, they compare the 
geographies marked as areas of influence for a given cartel by the algorithm to cartel areas 
of influence identified by the Mexican government, yielding a high degree of overlap. Second, 
they use the algorithm to identify municipalities “associated” with the incumbent governor 
of the State the municipality resides in. The algorithm can pair municipality names with the 
















Appendix B: Construction of alternative distance measures 
As a robustness check, as an alternate measure of exposure to the Mexican drug trade, I 
construct a measure of least distance to the geographic center of drug-cartel activity for the 
sample period 1995-2010. I use this measure in tests that complement parsimonious 
regressions using least distance to the border as a proxy of exposure to treatment. 
To construct this measure, I use variation in cartel presence in Mexican municipalities as 
measured using the data of Coscia and Ríos (2012). For each year 𝐶𝐶 ∈ {1995, … , 2010}, I flag a 
municipality as treated iff at least one cartel is found to operate within. Once I have 
determined the set 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = {1, … , 𝐽𝐽} of treated municipalities for a given year, I calculate the 
geographic centroid of each element j in this set, using shape-files available on the ESRI 
ArcGIS public repository. I thus obtain the set 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = �𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖1, … , 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖
𝐽𝐽� of centroid coordinates for each 
of the elements of 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖. 
I then calculate the geodesic distance 44  between each element of this set of centroid 
coordinates and each zip code used in the regression models presented in Table 5. Hence, if 
each year 𝐶𝐶 a set 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 of zip codes appears in the corresponding regression, I will obtain a set 
𝐽𝐽 × 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖  of distances. Lastly, for every (i-th) element of 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖  I calculate the average distance, 










44 See Vincenty, T. (1975). 






Figure A1. Retail bank branch locations in Border States 
 
This figure shows all retail-bank branches in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas (all lightly 
shaded) as of December 2015. Although the scale of the map is such that observing individual branches 















Figure A2. Drug seizures by USCBP 
 
This figure shows dollar-value weighted drug seizures at U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (USCBP) 
checkpoints from 2011 to 2017. Drug seizures used for the elaboration of this figure are solely of 
cannabis (marijuana) and cocaine. Drug price data was retrieved from a variety of sources, including 
time series published by the UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and prices retrieved from drug 
retail sites on the Dark Web. USCBP checkpoints include all points of entry into the United States 
along the Mexican border, as well as static checkpoints along highway transport corridors in the 
interior of the country. These checkpoints are identified as small, dark circles in the map above. Circle 
radii are proportional to the (log) dollar value of drugs seized at that checkpoint. Border States (AZ, 
CA, NM, and TX) are identified by shading in various tones of gray, which vary in tone by USCBP 
sector. Tonalities of gray represent the quintile to which the sector pertains in the cross-sectional 
distribution of undocumented-alien detentions for the same sample period. As can be seen, there is no 
obvious correlation between drug seizures and alien detentions in the small cross-section of sectors 
presented. 
 






Figure A2. Geographic center of cartel activity, 1995-2010 
 
This figure shows the shifting geographic center of drug-cartel activity in Mexico from 1995 to 2010. 














In addition to the aforementioned “distance-to-treatment” measure, I also calculate a 
“distance-to-seizure” as an alternative metric of exposure to criminal activity. This measure 
is constructed as follows: for each point of entry into the United States from Mexico, as well 
as from each USCBP checkpoint in the interior of the U.S. and lying within one of the States 
straddling the southern border (AZ, CA, NM, TX), I retrieve information on drug seizures 
from 2011 to 2017.  
Data on drug seizures made public by USCBP consists of tonnage seized of cocaine and 
cannabis (marijuana) by checkpoint and year. I am thus able to construct a checkpoint-
specific panel of seizures for each of these two categories of illicit drugs. Once I have 
constructed this two-dimensional panel, I weigh each data-point, respectively, by the going 
price of cocaine or marijuana in that year. Data for the prices of illicit drugs was pieced 
together from several sources, including notably data provided by the UNODC, as well as 
from drug-retail websites on the Dark Web. 
Once I have done this, I can calculate for each unit of observation i the following measure: 
 






The equation above gives the general form of the “distance-to-seizure” measure. In this 
expression, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗  symbolizes the geodesic distance between the unit of observation i and 
















Appendix C: Additional figures 
 
 
Figure A4. Nodes and edges in the US-Mexico cash-smuggling network 
 
This figure shows cities that operate as consolidation, deconsolidation, and destination nodes in the 
cash smuggling operations of organized crime syndicates operating between the United States and 
Mexico. Cash from illicit activities originates –and is prepared for transport—in cities highlighted in 
red, then moving to cities highlighted in yellow for “layering” and packaging for cross-border shipping. 
Flowing through border cities (highlighted in teal), cash is then re-consolidated on the Mexican side of 
the border in cities highlighted in red. Exit points from Mexico are highlighted in green: cash payments 
to drug producers and to fiscal havens are traced out from these points into Central and South 
America. 
 















Figure A5. MXN/USD exchange rate, 2000-2012 
This figure plots the daily spot MXN/USD market rate from 01/01/2000 to 12/31/2012. There are no 


























Figure A6. Illegal Border crossing arrests, USCBP Southwestern Sectors 2000-2014 
This figure plots monthly arrests made by the U.S. Customs and Border patrol for misdemeanor 
(unauthorized) border crossings in all nine patrol sectors straddling the Mexican border. There are no 
discernible large-scale variations in this statistic, ostensibly a proxy for the growth rate of illegal 
immigration from Mexico to the U.S., and thus of migrant remittances, which could be driving results 


























































Appendix D: Additional institutional detail 
 
A. The HSBC laundering case 
The particulars of this case suggest that HSBC executives anticipated a low chance of 
prosecution, or a lenient penalty if prosecuted. Interactions with drug cartel elements were 
quite brazen, with traffickers depositing “hundreds of thousands of dollars in bulk U.S. 
currency each day into HSBC Mexico accounts.”45 To place this cash efficiently through the 
bulletproof glass of teller windows at HSBC Mexico branches, drug traffickers used custom-
built boxes, tailored to the precise dimensions of teller window-holes.46 
 
B. The rise of Mexican cartels 
By the mid-2000s, Mexican drug trafficking organizations had “established overland 
transportation networks to transport cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin” 
robust enough to become the incumbent players in cocaine wholesale shipments into the 
United States (National Drug Intelligence Center, 2006). This rapid ascent in preeminence 
can be explained in significant measure by the displacement of the Colombian cartels, the 
market incumbents up to this point. Castillo, Mejía, & Restrepo (2014), using high-frequency 
administrative data, document how cocaine seizure activity in Colombia led to increases in 
the street price of narcotics in final consumer markets. This contributed in turn to both a rise 
in the profit margins of Mexican cartels and to increased violence in Mexico, as market entry 
by new competitors led to confrontations. By 2010, the leading Mexican cartel (Sinaloa, 
headed by the notorious Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman) was generating an annual profit 
estimated at $3 billion, a figure comparable to the contemporaneous net income of Netflix or 
Facebook (Radden Keefe, 2012). Violence, on the other hand, reached a febrile pitch by 2005, 
as turf wars between the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels over border emplacements boiled over 
 
 
45 United States DOJ Case 1:12-cr-00763-ILG, Attachment A. 
46 Ibid. 
 




(Molzahn, Ríos & Shirk, 2012). In response to this spike in violence, the administration of 
President Vicente Fox, in an unprecedented act, deployed a small contingent of troops to the 
border city of Nuevo Laredo in the summer of 2005. 
 
C. Money laundering and illicit financial flows 
In practice, the three phases of money laundering are often intertwined: for instance, a 
criminal organization might set up “fronts,” businesses with no economic purpose other than 
being a façade for illicitly produced cash flows.47 These businesses might hold accounts at 
banking institutions, and deposit these cash streams in them, disguised as revenue from 
operations. In this example, placement and layering would happen concurrently. 
According to the Financial Action Task Force (on Money Laundering) (FATF), the preeminent 
intergovernmental AML organization, “the amount of proceeds generated by predicate crimes 
committed in and outside of Mexico is high” and “proceeds derived from foreign predicate 
crimes [are] mostly related to Mexican transnational organized crime” (FATF, 2018). It 
follows that, in principle, the level of money laundering activity in Mexico is quite high. 
Laundering of the cash flows produced by Mexican criminal organizations is not confined to 
Mexico, however. In 2017, the Dutch bank Rabobank admitted to multiple instances of 
wrongdoing committed by its U.S. affiliate, reaching a $369M settlement with the DOJ. In 
the complaint presented against Rabobank, U.S. attorneys document how bank executives 
sought to enhance the operations of “star” branches in the Imperial Valley of California, flush 
with cash deposits from Mexican cartels, by downgrading and selectively enforcing the AML 
controls the bank had in place. This forbearance effectively provided a safe harbor for the 
laundering of millions of dollars of drug-trafficking revenue.48  
 
 
47 Apart from “front” businesses, common methods of “layering” are phantom invoicing, particularly in 
international trade, and “smurfing,” in which large deposits are fractioned into multiple smaller 
accounts, spread over a wide number of financial instruments and/or institutions. 
48 United States District Court, Southern District of California. Criminal Complaint, Title 18, USC Sec. 








The above anecdote illustrates a particular “use case” for “illicit financial flows.” By this term, 
in this paper I mean capital or monetary transfers, across national borders, of cash flows 
obtained from illegal activity. If Mexican cartels repatriate a fraction of their profits, once 
these monetary proceeds had been laundered through Rabobank, a next step was to somehow 
move these “newly clean” deposits across the Mexican border. 
The mechanisms by which drug cartels might have accomplished this are many. However, 
the anecdotes point to two major modes of operation: first, “smurfing,” in which many 
deposits (under the USD $10,000 BSA reporting threshold) are made, either at several banks, 
or serially by several distinct individuals (ACAMS, 2014).  Alternatively, cartel operatives 
might liaise with bank officers directly, agreeing to kickbacks in return for forbearance in 


















Bank Branch Networks, Banking 




In this paper, I explore if banks develop long-standing implicit contracts with criminal organizations, 
exploiting spatial variation in drug-cartel activity. I use Mexico, where local banking markets have 
been differentially exposed to this activity, as an empirical laboratory. I test whether banks with prior 
exposure to criminal activity are more likely to enter areas where cartels operate, as well as whether 
previous exposure to specific cartels predicts entry into local banking markets which said cartels have 
entered. Results suggest that certain banks do establish these: bank characteristics that have 
significant effects on differential behavior regarding “relationship-like” interactions with organized 





This paper seeks to answer the following questions: i. do banks establish implicit long-term 
contracts (Elsas, 2005) –analogous to relationship-lending interactions documented in the 
literature—with criminal agents in lax regulatory environments? ii. if so, what types of banks 
exhibit this behavior? 
The results I present in this paper suggest that, in the setting explored, certain banks do 
establish these “relationships.” Other banks appear to actively choose to operate in regions 
rife with organized crime, perhaps seeking deposit windfalls, but not to establish long-
standing implicit contracts with criminal organizations. Bank characteristics that have 
significant effects on differential behavior regarding organized criminal organizations are, in 
this setting, foreign vs. domestic majority equity ownership, as well as size. Results regarding




 the effect of having been designated as systemically important by bank regulators are 
inconclusive. Namely, the response of large, domestically held banks to prior organized 
criminal activity in terms of branch expansion in cartel-occupied areas is around 28 
percentage points higher than that of other banks, and the response of domestic banks in 
general to previous “relationship-like” interactions is around 20 percentage points higher 
than that of foreign banks.49 
In the previous paper of this dissertation (Aldama-Navarrete, 2019), I have presented 
evidence that banks actively choose to enter markets in which organized crime operates, 
despite the excess exposure to regulatory and operational risk this exposes them to. Although 
this evidence is consistent with banks operating with intent to facilitate financial services to 
criminal organizations, by no means is it a “smoking gun.” A priori, there are many narratives 
consistent with these findings; in particular, cartel entry might be endogenous to the very 
drivers of bank market entry.  It may also be the case that banks are not particularly good at 
assessing this excess risk burden, and that they enter these markets “chasing” deposits 
without correctly trading off expected costs and benefits. Lastly, banks might passively 
cooperate with organized crime, by either choosing to internalize “risk rents” by turning a 
blind eye to the nature of the operations carried out by criminal agents, or by acquiescing to 
the provision of financial services to these parties under duress, such as threats to the well-
being of their employees or physical capital.  
It remains relevant, however, to determine whether financial institutions willingly engage 
with criminal groups, or even –without intent—act as if they did, establishing long-standing 
working relationships with these. For one, answering these questions is of high relevance to 
policymakers in determining the optimal course of bank supervision policy. From an 
academic standpoint, investigating whether banks form relationships with economic actors 
that are extremely opaque informationally contributes to our understanding of what makes 
banks special.  
The well-known and numerous literature on relationship banking, beginning with Petersen 
and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995), has long argued that one of the principal ways 
 
 
49 See tables (5) and (3), respectively. 




in which banks are unique is their capacity to liaise with firms and individuals for whom 
information is costly to come by. According to this view, banks produce information about 
these agents’ credit risk, using “soft inputs” garnered through lengthy relationships. This 
alternative information allows banks to better assess sources of risk that are not apparent in 
“hard” data such as financial statements, either because these risks are correlated with 
standard metrics in a noisy manner, or because they are wholly orthogonal to them. This 
literature has built upon, among others, the theoretical insights of Diamond (1984), 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), and Fama (1985), who discuss the mitigation of agency 
and asymmetric information problems through the distinctive monitoring technologies 
possessed by banks, as well as the unique incentive structures faced by banks, vis-à-vis 
disperse claimants like bondholders.50   
Even within the set of firms that are reliant on relationship banking, there is evidence of 
heterogeneity in the importance of bank-firm relationships driven by firm opacity. Kano, 
Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2011), for instance, document how informational “verifiability” 
mediates firm-bank relationships: firms that are unable to obtain third-party verification for 
their operational results tend to value bank relationships more, and are more likely to be 
“captured” by financial intermediaries which service them. 
In the context I explore in this paper, it is crucial for the “firms” at stake to establish 
relationships with banks or conduct business with them in a way tantamount to this. Indeed, 
the business carried out by drug syndicates is the paragon of “unverifiability,” by design. 
Conversely, however, I argue that it is also quite valuable for banks to establish and maintain 
relationships with them. This is unintuitive, as these firms are awash in liquidity, and have 
effectively zero demand for credit. From the perspective of banks, therefore, the incentive to 
cultivate and maintain relationships with these economic actors must be quite different from 
the ones documented in previous papers.  
Indeed, it is neither necessary nor useful for banks to produce information on the credit risk 
of criminal syndicates: it is useful, however, to anticipate where and when these businesses 
 
 
50 Other noteworthy papers in this literature include Blackwell & Santomero (1982), Neuberger & Rathke-
Doppner (2015), Greenbaum, Kanatas, & Venezia (1989), and Haubrich (1989).  
 




will produce excess liquidity, as to capture rents derived from low-cost funding. This 
informational advantage becomes especially relevant if these rents have a “winner-take-all” 
nature, which is feasible if switching costs for these firms grow with the complexity of 
operations. 
All but the totality of the relationship banking literature focuses on the asset side of banks’ 
balance sheets: the canonical questions posed in these papers are i. if and how banks offer 
distinct loan terms to firms with which they have relationships ii. how banks change their 
form –operational, capital structure, etc.—in the face of these relationships; and iii. how firms 
react to the establishment –or disruption—of long-standing credit relationships. It is a 
completely open question if banks establish and maintain relationships with firms based on 
their funding needs –seeking to capture deposits generated by firm activity. Hence, this paper 
contributes to the relationship banking literature by proposing a different motivation for 
relationship banking: demand by banks for deposit flows.  
Although deposits are a major source of funding for retail banks, little is known regarding 
the influence that deposit seeking has on bank behavior. This is somewhat surprising, as we 
know that deposits remain valuable to banks even under bank risk neutrality, and that 
access to deposits shapes bank capital structure (Allen, Carletti, & Marquez, 2015). We also 
know that deposit seeking is endemic during bad times, especially among banks with weaker 
balance sheets (Acharya & Mora, 2015), and that deposit rates are at least in part determined 
by banks’ demand for funds (Ben-David, Palvia, & Spatt 2017). In particular, there is a dearth 
of literature on the spatial effects of bank deposit-seeking behavior (LeSage, 1995). Namely, 
we lack an understanding of how banks expand their retail operations in response to their 
funding needs. Such an understanding would allow us to partially endogenize local bank 
market structure, which has been documented to have real effects both through passive 
(deposit) interest rates (Allen, Saunders, & Udell, 1991; Ho & Ishii, 2011, Cortés & Strahan, 
2017), active rates (Corvoisier & Gropp, 2002), and financial inclusion and the financing of 
local economic activity (Nguyen, 2019).  
In this sense, this paper contributes to the wider understanding of the determinants of the 
growth of branch networks, which is still an under-researched question. Although there is a 
robust literature documenting the effects of branch-network growth (Chong, 1991; Demsetz 
and Strahan, 1997; Loutskina and Strahan, 2011; Goetz, Laeven, and Levine, 2016), few 




papers investigate the causes of this growth (Gropp, Noth, & Schüwer, 2019).51 Among the 
papers that do explore this question are Kim and Vale (2001) and Cohen and Mazzeo (2010): 
these papers, however, dwell on the determinants of the aggregate growth of branch 
networks, without accounting for the spatial dimension of this growth. Chang, Chaudhuri, & 
Jayaratne (1997), Chaudhuri et al. (1997) and Qi et al. (2019) provide analyses of the spatial 
expansion in branch networks, but only as a function of characteristics of the banking system, 
not of spatial units themselves. Lastly, other papers, such as Deller and Sundaram-Stukel 
(2012), who research spatial patterns in the location of credit unions in the United States, 
and Alamá et al. (2015), who investigate the growth of retail-bank networks in Spain as a 
function of geographic variables, provide little economic motivation for their research. 
A key question in these related literatures on branch network growth has been if bank 
geographical expansion leads to diversification of location-specific risks. In other words, if 
geographies carry endemic risks, is it the case that expanding banking operations to other 
locales hedges these risks? This paper contributes to this conversation. Entry into markets 
in which organized crime operates exposes banks to unique forms of regulatory and 
operational risk. However, banks choose to operate expand into these. Why?  
One possible answer is that banks specialize in assessing risks to which they have been 
exposed to through their past business, and expand into regions that expose them to similar, 
yet imperfectly correlated risks.52 Another –perhaps less socially desirable—answer is that 
banks specialize in producing information about particular criminal organizations, through 
data obtained via direct communication. This paper seeks to disentangle these potential 
causal channels. 
 
Demand for banking services by criminal organizations 
I have (tacitly) introduced the hypotheses that banks exhibit willingness to i. operate in local 
markets with organized criminal presence and ii. provide financial services –especially the 
 
 
51 Other related papers are Akhigbe and Whyte (2003), Emmons, Gilbert, and Yeager (2004), Carlson and 
Mitchener (2009), and Meslier et al. (2016). 
 
52 Gropp, Noth, & Schüwer (2019) document this type of bank behavior. 




escrow of deposits—to criminal organizations. However, the question remains: do organized 
crime syndicates –like drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)—demand banking services? I 
posit they do. 
This is manifest in the empirical record (see Aldama-Navarrete, 2019), as it is in numerous 
anecdotes.53 Among these, a notable one is the attempt to purchase a banking group outright 
by agents of Amado Carrillo Fuentes, an infamous drug lord known in Mexico by the moniker 
“El Señor de los Cielos”—between 1995 and 1996. Before the seizure and liquidation of Grupo 
Financiero Anáhuac by Mexican regulators in late 1996, agents of the Ciudad Juárez-based 
kingpin had purchased stock in this banking group to the tune of almost $13 million dollars; 
by then, this bank had become a key part of their cartel’s business strategy, serving as the 
conduit for remitting profits from the sale of illegal drugs in the United States to accounts in 
the Cayman Islands (Preston, 1998).54 
Not only do bank connections serve organized crime as channels through which to launder 
illicit proceeds, but also to de-risk their operations. Criminal organizations have no recourse 
to the legal system to safeguard their contracts and property rights; hence, they are especially 
vulnerable to agency problems. Securing a third-party custodian for the cash flows they 
produce is thus key to avoiding the excessive consumption of perquisites by lieutenants, as 
well as outright graft by these –or competitor groups. Lastly, cash proceeds which have been 
deposited into the banking system are at diminished risk of being impounded by authorities. 
Considering the above, in this paper I seek to document whether banks form long-standing 
relationships with illicit firms or conduct business as if these relationships existed. Moreover, 
I ask which, if any, bank characteristics predict the likelihood of these “relationships.” By 
doing so, this paper contributes to the nascent finance literature that seeks to shed light on 
the interactions between banks and organized crime.55 
 
 
53 In the previous chapter of this dissertation, I have provided evidence that deposit services are likely used by 
economic agents connected to the “drug economy,” both in the form of causal inference of the positive effect of local 
drug cartel presence on bank deposits, and in anecdotes retrieved from judicial cases. 
54 Notably, the seizure of the bank’s assets was unrelated to narcotics, and due to other fraudulent activity. 
55 See Aldama-Navarrete (2019); Williams, Slutzky, & Villamizar-Villegas (2019); Agca, Slutzky, & Zeume (2020). 




The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 I describe the data used, as well as 
sample construction. Section 3 discusses the identification strategy pursued, while Section 4 




I use two main sources of data in this paper. First, I use data on the geographical areas of 
operation of Mexican drug cartels, from 1995 to 2010. This data is obtained from the database 
constructed by Coscia and Ríos (2012), which is described in detail in the appendices of the 
first chapter of this dissertation. 
In a nutshell, however, Coscia and Ríos construct a cartel-specific measure of activity, at 
municipal scale, from 1990 to 2010. This measure is assembled from print news-media 
mentions of cartel activity, mostly from local news sources, aggregated by Google News. The 
Coscia-Ríos (henceforth, CR) dataset covers the activity of seven major criminal 
organizations, and also reports three “catch-all” categories: two of these tally mentions of 
minor groups allied with a couple of the major cartels, while the remaining one tallies all 
other mentions of minor criminal groups involved in wholesale drug trafficking.  
Figure 1 plots the spatial distribution of cartel activity at the end of the sample period of this 
study. In this figure, municipalities with two or more cartels operating within are shaded in 
red, while those with only one drug cartel present are shaded orange. Municipalities in which 
no drug cartels operated are colored cream, while those for which there is missing data 
appear shaded gray. As can be seen, drug cartel activity was widespread across the Mexican 
territory by 2010, with little discernible clustering: (minor) clustering does appear along the 
border with the United States, and along the coastal regions, however. This is most likely a 
consequence of the layout of the major highway networks in Mexico, which are roughly 
oriented along a North-South axis and hug the Pacific and Gulf coasts. 
Second, I use data from reports published by the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores 
(CNBV), the primary regulator of the banking sector in Mexico. In particular, I use the “Base 
Operativa” report, which details municipality-level information for all banks with retail 
operations in the country. This information includes number of branches per 




municipality/bank, as well as personnel employed and number of accounts for a variety of 
bank products, at the same level of aggregation. I also collect balance-sheet data, at monthly 
frequency, for all banks reporting it, which is available within the “Balance general” report 
made public by the CNBV.56 
 
Sample construction 
I merge this branch data with the Coscia-Ríos cartel activity data, using state and 
municipality names to perform a fuzzy match, which I then verify manually to ensure “clean” 
correspondence. Although I start with 97 banks having operated in Mexico between 1995 and 
2010, consolidating bank holding companies and dropping bank-years with no branches 
reported leaves 39 banks with branches across 2,457 municipalities. Inconsistencies in 
matching between the banking data and the Coscia-Ríos dataset reduce municipality 
coverage to 2,415.  
Branch reporting, however, is quite spotty in Mexican regulatory reports, leading to many 
municipality years being unobserved. My final sample includes 282,946 municipality-bank-
year combinations: I then further merge this data with bank asset data from the CNBV and 
geolocation data obtained from INEGI, the official Mexican statistical agency.   
Table 1 (Panel A) presents summary statistics for key dependent and independent variables 
used in this study. 
These variables are as follows: 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  is a count of the number of branches in 
municipality i operated by bank j in year t. 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable which takes on the 
value of one for municipality-year pair (i, t) if any number of drug cartels operate therein 
contemporaneously; 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is analogous to this binary treatment measure, but 
tallies the total number of cartels which are in operation in municipality i. 
MA5(𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖) is a five-year moving average measure of exposure to cartel activity. 
To construct this measure of exposure, I first define: 
 
 
56 Report number 040-5A-R0. 
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That is, the sum of branches of bank j over all municipalities i in year t, each of these 
interacted with an indicator which takes the value of one if the municipality is 
contemporaneously treated. Hence, only branches in treated municipalities will be counted 
toward the branch total of bank j.  
Once I have constructed this variable, I subtract for each municipality i the number of treated 
branches therein from 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 . This gives me a three-dimensional measure 
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖, which is purged from the endogenous contribution that locally treated 
branches make to the bank-level aggregate 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖. 
Using this variable, I then construct a moving average of bank-level exposure, using five lags 
of 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 . 
 




 ∀𝑙𝑙 ∈ {1,2, … ,5} (2) 
 
Assets is a bank-specific control variable, defined as the total bank assets, at monthly 
frequency, reported by bank j, averaged over year t. 
𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  is constructed almost exactly as is 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 , except that in 
equation (1), Treated 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is replaced with its cartel-specific analogue, 𝟙𝟙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖{𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘}  (a 
municipality-year dummy which is one if cartel k is active in municipality i in year t, and 




57 Panel B of Table 1 presents correlation coefficients for 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 and 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 across a 
variety of subsamples. As can be seen, the covariation of these measures is quite modest across these. 









Lastly, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 is a cartel-level analogue of 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖. It is a measure of 
exposure to banks that operate at time t in municipality i, for a cartel k that has 
contemporaneous presence in this municipality. Importantly, again, this measure only 
captures exposure experienced in other municipalities (that are not i).  
 
3 Identification strategy 
 
Determining whether criminal activity has any bearing on the decisions of banks to enter 
and carry out operations in certain markets is nontrivial. There are several reasons this is 
the case: for one, reverse causality is a potential issue. Since crime syndicates prize their 
connections to the financial system, they might locate in areas with more robust bank-branch 
networks. Omitted variables might also confound the effect of local drug-cartel presence on 
bank operations. For one, local economic conditions might influence both the market entry –
and permanence—decisions of banks, and the analogous choices of criminal groups. 
Certainly, the market entry decisions of banks are contingent on expectations regarding 
credit demand among markets in their choice set. However, criminal cartels are also 
businesses, and profit from having access to more robust factor markets, better 
transportation networks, etc. Hence, as both criminal enterprises and banks might flock to 
the same geographical regions; namely, those with higher levels of economic activity, or 
expectations of economic growth. This would entail that the estimated effect of cartel activity 
on banks would be biased upward. 
Another important issue is that if certain banks indeed do form relationships with criminal 
groups, or conduct business in a way tantamount to this, the risk tolerance of these 
intermediaries is bound to be quite unique vis-à-vis the modal bank. This risk tolerance –or 
close correlates thereof—is bound to also influence decisions of where to operate. In this case, 
the propensity to form business alliances with criminal organizations and the location 
pattern of a bank’s retail activity would both be endogenous to unobserved characteristics. 




Additionally, if there does exist a positive relationship between cartel presence and the 
likelihood of market entry or branch network expansion on behalf of banks, this could also 
introduce the issue of reflexivity to the estimation of parameters measuring this association. 
Namely, if banks do “chase” deposits generated by drug-trading activity, and criminal 
organizations demand financial services (and thus desire to locate where these are available), 
there is bound to be feedback from banking supply to demand, and vice-versa. 
To circumvent these issues, I exploit variation both in the timing of the treatment of 
municipalities, and the joint presence of banks and cartels in other municipalities to identify 
the impact of previous exposure to criminal activity on the branch-network expansion 
decisions of a bank.  
Since the fixed costs of operation in a given municipality are fairly low for a given cartel, and 
as these organizations shift their areas of operation at relatively high frequency, the presence 
of a cartel in a given municipality, in a given year, is plausibly orthogonal to the local 
characteristics which make the presence of a bank therein more –or less—likely. Indeed, 
these characteristics would evolve at much lower frequency.  
Furthermore, I have shown in Aldama-Navarrete (2019), exploiting the same setting as the 
one explored in this paper, that the arrival of drug-cartel activity into a municipality is an 
exogenous shock to local bank deposits: there are no clear pre-trends which differentiate 
treated vs. untreated municipalities along this dimension before this arrival. Hence, cartel 
presence may be thought as instrumenting for the expected supply of deposits. Lastly, the 
exposure of a bank to organized criminal activity outside of municipality i prior to time t is 
plausibly conditionally exogenous to the contemporaneous decision to establish a branch in 
municipality i. 
Hence, the identification strategy I follow can be thought of as akin to a dynamic differences-
in-differences estimation, with the key difference that it is the inclusion of an observation 
into the regression which is conditional on treatment, not the independent variables “turning 
on.”58 The baseline regression specification I run is of the form: 
 
 
58 I also run models in which the criterion for inclusion is assignment to treatment: this is further detailed in 
Section 4. 





ln� Branches𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖� = α𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + τ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1ln�𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴5� 1+BranchesTreated 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�� + 𝛽𝛽2ln �𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴5 � 1+Relationships𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�� + ε𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(4) 
 
In equation (3) above, 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is the number of branches of bank j in municipality i, at 
time t, while 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is a municipality-bank fixed effect, and 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a municipality-year fixed effect. 
BranchesTreated 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 and Relationships𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 are defined as before (see equations (1)-(3)); given 
their construction, it is plausible that these variables are conditionally orthogonal to the error 
term in equation (4). 
Simply put, I regress branches of a given bank, in a given municipality i, in year t on a lagged 
five-year moving average of “treated” branches and a lagged five-year moving average of 
exposure to cartels present in i, for this same bank. The purpose of this exercise is to 
determine if banks “chase after” either i. deposits generated by organized criminal activity, 
ii. deposits generated by organized criminal groups with which they have had a history of 




Table 2 presents results of several estimations of equation (4). In all these estimations, the 
sample period begins in 2000, to allow the construction of the variables 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴5�𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖� and 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴5�𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖� for all observational units, although the 
data for variable construction spans 1995-2010.  
Column (1) reports unsaturated models, while columns (2) and (3) report results for models 
in which municipality × year fixed effects have been included, to control for municipality-
specific demand shocks. In the latter, municipality × bank and bank × year fixed effects have 
also been included, to control for bank-specific unobservables, both static and time-varying. 
The upper panel of Table 2 contains results for the sample of municipalities “assigned to 
treatment” (ATT); i.e. those that are either treated contemporaneously or were treated in a 
prior period, but no longer are. The bottom panel contains results for the sample of 
contemporaneously treated municipalities. 




In all estimations, the estimated elasticity of 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 to treated branches is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, and in the first two columns range from ~6% (Treated panel, 
column (1))  to 16% (Treated panel, column (2)), depending on the specification; estimated 
elasticities to 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  are for the most part negative, although also mostly non-
significant. 
Column (3) and (4), however, report much higher coefficient loadings on 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖, 
once bank × year fixed effects are included: estimated elasticities jump to anywhere from 
around 27% (ATT panel, column (4)) to around 40% (Treated panel, column (3)). 
These results, taken together, point at the following: i. there is evidence of banks seeking 
deposits by responding to prior exposure to organized criminal activity and ii. there is 
unobserved cross-sectional bank heterogeneity driving the pattern of variation in the 
dependent variable. 
 
A. Heterogeneous effects 
To better understand this heterogeneity, I run tests in which I interact 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴5(𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)  with dummies for two bank characteristics that may be of 
importance: majority domestic equity ownership (Domestic) and G7 status, or membership in 
the group of seven largest banks in the Mexican market.59 This definition coincides also with 
the CNBV definition of systemically important banks within the Mexican banking system. 
(Juárez, 2018). I perform these tests on both municipality subsamples: ATT municipalities 
and municipalities that are contemporaneously treated; in this battery of tests, I remove 
bank × year fixed effects, as otherwise time-varying bank characteristics would be absorbed. 
Likewise, asset decile fixed effects are removed, to prevent collinearity with controls 
described below. I take this battery of tests to be the “baseline” set of specifications in this 
paper: headline quantitative estimates are derived from this set of estimations. 
Table 3 reports results of these tests; the first two columns report estimations on the ATT 
sample, while columns (3) and (4) report results for the treatment sample. All models contain 
 
 
59 These seven banks are BBVA, Banorte, Banamex, HSBC, Inbursa, Scotiabank, and Santander. 




municipality × year and municipality × bank fixed effects; in addition, models reported in 
columns (2) and (4) contain bank assets, bank ROA and total deposits (scaled by assets) as 
controls. As can be seen in this table, interaction terms absorb the lion’s share of the variation 
in branches: interactions between branches treated and G7 status yield strongly negative and 
significant loadings (row 2), while both the interaction of relationships and domestic status 
(row 6) and the triple interaction of  branches treated with Domestic and G7 dummies (row 
7) yield strongly positive and significant loadings.  
Two preliminary conclusions might be drawn from results reported so far: i. the positive 
response of branch networks to (indiscriminate) previous organized criminal activity is 
driven almost exclusively by domestic G7 banks, and ii. domestic banks exhibit an 
anomalously positive response to prior cartel-specific exposure (around 12% higher branch 
expansion in ATT municipalities, and around 20% higher in treated municipalities, as 
compared to foreign banks). 
How to interpret these results? It is perhaps somewhat unsurprising that interaction terms 
carrying the Domestic dummy exhibit positive loadings, signifying that previous cartel 
exposure predicts greater propensity to enter municipalities in which organized crime groups 
currently reside. After all, foreign banks must contend with dual regulation, both in Mexico 
and in their home country, which might improve governance. Furthermore, as most foreign 
banks in Mexico are majority-owned by bank holding companies residing in either the EU or 
the United States, they must also contend with extraterritorial anti-corruption and anti-
money laundering norms, extant in both legal systems. Hence, out of greater aversion to 
engage in corrupt activity –or simply less willingness to shoulder operational risk—foreign 
banks might actively avoid markets in which they know drug-trading organizations (DTOs) 
are active. 
It is perhaps more surprising that a correlate of bank size, such as the 𝐺𝐺7 dummy, would load 
positively in these models. However, there is some evidence that the “too big to fail” status 
afforded to these banks by regulators through their classification as systemically important 
might engender moral hazard. For instance, regulatory reports released in 2015 note that 
80% of all bank sanctions imposed in 2015Q1 were concentrated in just two of the G7 banks; 
the reports also document one of these two banks had also led the tally of sanctions for 
FY2014 (Notimex, 2015). 




Further, there is also some evidence that the G7 banks are relatively opaque, as compared to 
their smaller peers. With monthly frequency, banks must submit to the CNBV several reports 
on their operations, including up-to-date financial information. Once processed, regulators 
make this information public, typically with a lag of one quarter. If a bank fails to submit 
information in a timely manner to the banking authorities, it will receive a sanction, which 
might carry a fine. Failure to comply in time with reporting requirements, however, is quite 
rampant. For reference, in the first semester of FY2017, 21.7% of required reports were not 
delivered on time (CNBV, 2017).60  In untabulated tests, I find that G7 status positively and 
significantly predicts the likelihood of a bank being sanctioned for late reporting by the 
CNBV, from FY2000 to FY2010. 
 
B. Risk stance or relationships? 
The evidence produced by tests presented so far points to previous bank exposure to 
organized-crime activity, both aggregate and cartel-specific, as a predictor of market entry or 
market presence in localities with contemporaneous criminal activity. Further, results 
presented in Table (3) point to both domestic and G7 status as mediating these treatment 
effects. However, what is the relative importance of these bank characteristics in driving 
this?  
Also, can we shed light on the channels through which prior exposure to organized-crime 
activity might make entry into markets with cartel presence more likely? For instance, are 
results obtained consistent with well-diversified banks entering areas which expose them to 
excess risk, as they can shoulder it? Is bank-cartel collusion the sole explanation for results 
obtained? To address these questions, I perform subsample analyses parallel to tests already 
reported, in which I split the sample by i. G7 status and ii. bank size. This allows me to gather 
evidence regarding which banks engage in “cartel-chasing” behavior, in a more interpretable 
way than that reported in Table (3). 
 
 
60 A likely reason for this is that penalties levied on banks are quite lenient: from FY2010 to the present, the 
maximum fine imposed on a bank by the CNBV amounts to MXN 8,331,600; this is roughly equivalent to $424,000 
at the mean MXN/USD exchange rate for 2017 (CNBV, 2020). 
 




Tables (4) and (5) present the results of these exercises. In Table (4), I report results of 
estimating equation (4) on nested subsamples defined by G7 status and foreign/domestic 
ownership. As can be seen in this panel, no significant loadings appear in estimations 
performed on the G7 subsample: this is most likely a result of low statistical power; 
consequently, there is not much that can be concluded regarding this part of the exercise. 
However, within the non-G7 sample, the foreign/domestic split yields an interesting result: 
the branching-elasticity calculated for relationships treated loads negative (~ -15%) and 
significant in the sample of foreign banks, but positive and significant (~3%) in the sample of 
domestic banks. This strengthens the contention that only domestic banks exhibit behavior 
consistent with relationship banking vis-à-vis DTOs.61 
In Table (5), I report results obtained from estimating equation (4) below: 
 
ln� Branches𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖� = α𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + τ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋�𝜷𝜷 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗 + ε𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 (5) 
 
In (4), 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  is a bank-year varying asset decile fixed effect, 𝑋𝑋�  is a vector with entries 
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 and 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗 is a bank-specific domestic dummy, and 
all other variables are as before. I perform estimations of (4) for both ATT and treatment 
samples and split the sample into “large” and “small” banks, defined as being above (below) 
the yearly median of size by assets.62 
Results of these tests are presented in Table (5). The sign pattern, as well as the pattern 
coefficient magnitudes obtained, are quite striking. Again, as in previous tests, only domestic 
banks appear to exhibit “cartel-chasing” behavior: positive and significant loadings are 
obtained only for interaction terms including the Domestic dummy. Furthermore, the 
large/small bank split appears to be relevant: loadings on 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 
terms are insignificant for the latter group, but large and significant (~27%) for the former 
 
 
61 Table (4) presents results of estimations carried out only on the ATT sample; tests performed on the treatment 
sample are not tabulated, as they too suffer from low power. 
62 Dividing the sample along this cut, rather than along the G7 dimension allows for greater power, as does not 
splitting the sample into foreign/domestic subsamples, but rather using an interaction term. 




(large banks). Interaction terms including 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  display the opposite pattern: 
loadings are non-significant for large banks, but positive (~14%) and significant for small 
banks. 
C. Robustness 
Several concerns might be brought up regarding results presented so far. For one, branch 
exposure to cartel activity may be mechanically higher for banks with a geographically 
concentrated market presence, such as regional banks: these banks will have higher 
exposures to cartels centered around the same regions.63  If these banks were to expand their 
branch networks, but their spatial choice sets were constrained to areas in which they 
already operate, average treatment effect estimates would be biased upward. 
There is also the issue of reflexivity/reverse causality.  It may be that the pattern of observed 
variation is driven by the locational choices of cartels, and not those of banks: since it is 
profitable for DTOs to have ready access to the banking system, it is to be expected that 
cartels will operate in areas with greater banking presence. Moreover, even if the observed 
variation is driven by the endogenous location choices of banks, driven by deposit-seeking of 
illegal monies, it may be that this is itself a consequence of previous location choices by 
cartels, and so on. 
To address the first concern, I both estimate the equation 
 




63  In their infancy, DTOs tend to be centered around a city, and control drug traffic flowing through the 
surrounding area. This is reflected in cartel names such as the Juárez Cartel (after Ciudad Juárez) or the Tijuana 
Cartel. Mature cartels, such as the Sinaloa Cartel, have diversified operations spanning multiple Mexican states, 
and even straddling international boundaries. This latter cartel, for instance, was thought to have operations in 
no less than thirteen countries as early as 2012 (Pachico, 2012). 




and re-estimate equation (5) on the ATT sample, and include municipality × year and 
municipality × bank fixed effects; additionally, I split the sample into bins defined by distance 
from observation ijt to the geographical center of branching activity for bank j in year t.64 
Importantly, the bins into which the sample is split are nested: each successively larger 
category contains preceding ones. I consider seven distance categories, in which the radius 
for included observations increases by either 100 or 200 miles.65 
Results for these tests are reported in Table 6; Panel A contains estimations of (5), while 
Panel B reports estimations of (6). If it were true that what drives the estimated treatment 
effects was the overlap of bank and cartel areas of influence, we should see the point 
estimates for coefficients on both 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  and 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  decrease as the 
estimation radius increases. This is not the case: in both panels, the interaction terms all but 
absorb variation, rendering loadings on 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  and 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  non-
significant. Moreover, loadings calculated on interaction terms are quite stable across bins, 
and do not exhibit a monotone pattern. 
I now turn to the potential objection of reverse causality/reflexivity. As robustness checks for 
this potential source of bias, I conduct two sets of tests. First, I re-estimate equation (4) using 
the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimation procedure (Arellano and Bond 1991). This 
allows me to relax the assumption of strict exogeneity for the key independent regressors, 
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 and 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖, and to model the dependent variable as dynamic, 
depending on its own past realizations, as we would expect under recursive reverse causality.  
Results for these tests are presented in Table 7: column (1) contains results for the full ATT 
sample, column (2) for the sample of domestic banks, (3) for large banks, and (4) for large 
domestic banks.66 The sign pattern obtained in these estimations is fully consistent with the 
findings put forth so far: relationships load positive and significant only for domestic samples, 
while branches treated only does so for the sample of large domestic banks. Point estimates 
obtained are quite distinct from the ones yielded by “similar” specifications presented 
 
 
64 Large is an indicator variable consistent with the definition of large banks used in previous estimations: it takes 
on the value of one if a bank is above median in size as measured by assets in year t, and zero otherwise. In 
untabulated tests, I also try interacting with a G7 dummy; results are qualitatively similar. 
65 Results are robust to alternative distance thresholds. 
66 Large banks are defined as before. 




elsewhere in this paper. This is not surprising, however: the Arellano-Bond procedure 
“sweeps away” observation fixed effects by first differencing data –and, in the setting 
explored, as has been established, bank- and municipality-level heterogeneity account for a 
good deal of the variation in outcomes. 
The second robustness check I perform to address reverse causality/reflexivity is running 
estimations in which the structure of the data has been reconfigured to vary at the 
municipality-cartel-year level. In these tests, the key independent variables are lags of the 
exposure of a cartel k to a bank i; namely, a binary indicator of cartel activity (for cartel k) in 
this municipality is regressed on lags of this exposure metric. I begin by using five lags of the 
data, to match the lag structure of previous tests, and then successively drop lags for which 
loadings are non-significant in previous model iterations.67 As “controls,” corresponding lags 
of the dependent variable are included in the model specifications. 
These tests might be thought of as naïve dynamic-panel models, in which I allow for 
violations of strict exogeneity of the independent variable at different lags by including a 
variety of maximum lags of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the estimated 
regression equation.68  
Results for these exercises are reported in Table 8. Significance stabilizes at a maximum lag 
of two: for this number of lags, (prior) marginal exposure of a cartel k to a market in which a 
bank j is present –given that this same bank is present contemporaneously in the 
municipality i under consideration—is associated with a 0.01 percentage-point increase in 
the likelihood of k entering municipality i, for lags of both one and two years. 
The mean of prior cartel-level exposure to markets in which banks active in i were active 
(Bank exposure) is 51.65 (SD =138.46); hence, a one-standard deviation increase in cartel 
exposure to banks in i would increase the likelihood of cartel presence in this municipality 
by ~1.39 percentage points. In spite of this low economic significance, however, the global 
significance F-statistic for the two-lags model (Column (9) in Table 7) is 29.62, which yields 
 
 
67 The Akaike Information Criterion is minimized for three lags of the data. Recall that in previous tests, the 
effective maximum lag of the data used in estimation was five, due to how the key independent variables are 
constructed (see equations (1)-(3)). 
68 An important caveat is that the point estimates obtained in these tests should not be taken too seriously –
these estimations most likely suffers from Nickell (1981) bias. 




a p-value that is equal to zero up to the third significant digit.69 This is a valid Granger-
causality test statistic for the response of the dependent variable to Bank exposure; hence, 
the null hypothesis of non-causation of cartel activity by Bank exposure is soundly rejected. 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Previous papers have documented that i. banks learn about risk through their business 
activity (Bouwman & Malmendier, 2015); ii. banks diversify away risk through geographical 
expansion of their activity –in particular, their retail-branching business (Morgan & 
Samolyk, 2003; Deng & Elyasiani, 2008; Aguirregabiria, Clark, & Wang, 2016); and iii. lower 
transparency, poorer governance, and low competition are associated with higher levels of 
bank corruption (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2006; Barth et al., 2009; Houston, Lin, & 
Ma, 2011).  
This paper adds to these findings by documenting that both previous exposure to drug-cartel 
activity and previous exposure to specific DTOs predict bank entry into areas rife with 
organized crime. Although certainly the setting explored in this paper is unique in many 
ways, Mexico is far from being peculiar in its lax legal enforcement, oligopolistic banking 
market structure, and low standards of bank transparency. Thus, there is bound to be some 
generalizability to the results presented in this paper. 
Namely, these (key) results are as follows: large domestic banks, perhaps keen to capture the 
cheap funding streams provided by deposit activity in areas where DTOs are active, enter 
these markets through the establishment of branches. These banks, however, do not establish 
long-standing relationships with cartels. There is evidence, however, that smaller domestic 
banks, may establish these relationships –either outright, or functionally so. This is perhaps 
to be expected, as these banks are more reliant on steady deposit flows as funding sources, 
 
 
69 The claim of low statistical significance is true under the assumption of non-cointegration (which would entail 
long-run causal dependence) of these variables. 




as they face financial constraints in the interbank market, and must pay a steep premium 
for funding obtained through this medium (Martinez-Jaramillo et al., 2014; Kim, 2017). 
Why are results driven by domestic banks? A priori, one might hypothesize that one reason 
might be that these have informational advantages over foreign ones. Experience as market 
participants might enable them to better assess the risk/reward trade-off associated with 
entering areas which might expose them to both deposit windfalls and significant operational 
and regulatory risks. However, a cursory look at the history of the Mexican banking system 
reveals this to not be the case: five constituent banks of the G7 are foreign; in all these cases, 
foreign ownership was effected through M&A deals, not de novo entry (Citigroup acquired 
Banamex in 2001, BBVA acquired Bancomer in several operations between 2000 and 2004; 
Santander acquired Serfin in 2000, HSBC acquired Bital in 2002, and Scotiabank acquired 
Inverlat in 2000).70 
Since it would be quite far-fetched to claim that institutional memory or expertise were 
displaced suddenly upon the advent of foreign equity ownership for these intermediaries, the 
hypothesis of differential governance quality takes on greater credence. However, from the 
data at hand, it is impossible to conclude if it is better external governance (legal institutions) 
or better internal governance which make these banks less likely to engage –be it passively 
or actively—with illicit actors 
Lastly, is it the case that “systemically important” status makes banks more willing to engage 
in (apparently) disreputable activities, perhaps through a moral hazard channel? The 
evidence obtained in this study is inconclusive: bank size appears to almost crowd out G7 
status fully in explanatory power, but given the high collinearity of these variables, any 






70 See González and Peña, 2012. 
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This panel reports estimated Pearson correlations for the key independent variables used in this paper: MA5(𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ) and 
MA5(𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖). The unit of observation for this calculation is the municipality-bank-year. Correlation coefficients are reported for the 
full sample, the subsample of domestic banks, G7 banks, and large banks (defined as having above median assets in year t): these subsamples 
are not mutually exclusive. 
 
 
Variable Level of variation Units/Type N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Branches Muni-bank-year Count 282,946 0.302 1.899 0 134
Treated Muni-year Binary 282,946 0.225 0.417 0 1
Cartels active Muni-year Count 282,946 0.436 0.971 0 9
MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) Muni-bank-year Count, 5-yr moving average 217,995 225.030 297.850 -1 1,321
MA 5 (1+Relationships) Muni-bank-year Count, 5-yr moving average 217,994 1.503 3.782 0 50
Assets Bank-year MXP, millions 248,238 168,649.400 287,070.500 0 1,183,483
BankExposure Cartel-year Count, market-level 141,630 51.646 138.460 0 1,786
MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated)










Table 2. Baseline treatment effects, municipality-level branching 
This panel reports estimates of regressions of the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of 
branches of bank j in municipality i at time t on a five-year moving average of the natural logarithm 
of (one plus) the number of treated branches of bank j and a five-year moving average of the natural 
logarithm of (one plus) the number of “cartel relationships” held by bank j. Depending on the 
specification, estimated regression equations include municipality by year, municipality by bank, bank 
by year, or asset-decile (at yearly frequency) fixed effects. The reported R-squared is the estimated 
adjusted within-cell statistic. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, and clustered at the 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) 0.086*** 0.134*** 0.353** 0.271**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.137) (0.118)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) 0.018 -0.115*** -0.023 -0.024
(0.020) (0.033) (0.018) (0.019)
Muni × Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Muni × Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Bank × Year FE No No Yes Yes
Asset decile FE No No No Yes
Observations 61,887 61,887 57,666 54,473
R-squared 0.101 0.508 0.913 0.914
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) 0.061*** 0.164*** 0.404** 0.317**
(0.015) (0.022) (0.156) (0.136)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) 0.086** -0.197*** -0.070 -0.067
(0.036) (0.060) (0.053) (0.052)
Muni × Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Muni × Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Bank × Year FE No No Yes Yes
Asset decile FE No No No Yes
Observations 53,919 53,919 48,527 46,020
R-squared 0.101 0.507 0.910 0.912
Robust standard errors in parentheses








Table 3. Treatment effects on municipality-level branching, including heterogeneous effects 
(Core results) 
This panel reports estimates of regressions of the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of 
branches of bank j in municipality i at time t on a five-year moving average of the natural logarithm 
of (one plus) the number of treated branches of bank j and a five-year moving average of the natural 
logarithm of (one plus) the number of “cartel relationships” held by bank j. Depending on the 
specification, interactions of the independent variables with a G7 dummy or a dummy for domestic 
majority equity ownership are included. Estimated regression equations include municipality by year 
and municipality by bank fixed effects. Models reported in columns (2) and (4) contain bank assets, 
bank ROA and total deposits (scaled by assets) as controls. The reported R-squared is the estimated 
adjusted within-cell statistic. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, and clustered at the 
bank-year level. The sample period for all regressions is 2000-2010. Columns (1) and (2) report 





(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) -0.013 -0.013 0.015 0.013
(0.028) (0.028) (0.057) (0.057)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) -0.099 -0.094 -0.175 -0.162
(0.067) (0.066) (0.131) (0.131)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) × G7 -0.228*** -0.229** -0.285*** -0.292***
(0.085) (0.094) (0.100) (0.108)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) × G7 0.085 0.093 0.120 0.146
(0.060) (0.058) (0.115) (0.114)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) × Domestic -0.032 -0.038 -0.074 -0.076
(0.035) (0.033) (0.058) (0.056)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) × Domestic 0.128** 0.117** 0.211* 0.191*
(0.058) (0.055) (0.112) (0.111)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) × Domestic × G7 0.307*** 0.302*** 0.355*** 0.356***
(0.097) (0.109) (0.109) (0.121)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) × Domestic × G7 -0.100* -0.103* -0.130 -0.150
(0.059) (0.057) (0.118) (0.117)
Muni sample ATT ATT Treated Treated
Muni × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni × Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 57,666 53,826 48,527 45,524
R-squared 0.897 0.902 0.893 0.899
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(1+Branches)




Table 4. Subsample tests, foreign v. domestic and G7 status 
This panel reports estimates of regressions of the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of 
branches of bank j in municipality i at time t on a five-year moving average of the natural logarithm 
of (one plus) the number of treated branches of bank j and a five-year moving average of the natural 
logarithm of (one plus) the number of “cartel relationships” held by bank j. Estimated regression 
equations include municipality by year and municipality by bank fixed effects; models reported in 
columns (2) and (4) include asset-decile fixed effects as well. The top panel in this table reports 
estimation results from tests performed on the subsample of G7 banks, while the bottom one reports 
results from estimations on non-G7 banks. Columns (1) and (2) (for both panels) report estimations 
performed on the sample of foreign banks; the latter two columns report results from the sample of 
domestic banks. The reported R-squared is the estimated adjusted within-cell statistic. Standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, and clustered at the bank-year level. The sample period for all 
regressions is 2000-2010. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) -0.017 -0.084 -0.032 -0.017
(0.101) (0.079) (0.116) (0.078)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) -0.057 -0.041 0.027 -0.008
(0.150) (0.138) (0.028) (0.025)
Muni × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni × Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Asset decile FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 14,842 11,929 5,964 5,964
R-squared 0.935 0.940 0.953 0.956
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) 0.011 0.010 -0.052** -0.049**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) -0.150** -0.151** 0.032* 0.024*
(0.066) (0.066) (0.017) (0.014)
Muni × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni × Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Asset decile FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 4,993 4,985 31,861 31,589
R-squared 0.771 0.771 0.895 0.891
Robust standard errors in parentheses










Table 5. Subsample tests, small v. large banks 
This panel reports estimates of regressions of the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of 
branches of bank j in municipality i at time t on a five-year moving average of the natural logarithm 
of (one plus) the number of treated branches of bank j and a five-year moving average of the natural 
logarithm of (one plus) the number of “cartel relationships” held by bank j, and interactions of these 
independent variables with a  dummy for domestic majority equity ownership.  Columns (1) and (2) 
report results from models estimated on small banks, defined as having below-median assets in year 
t. Columns (3) and (4) report tests for large banks (above median asset holdings). Estimated regression 
equations include municipality by year and municipality by bank fixed effects; models reported in 
columns (2) and (4) include asset-decile fixed effects as well.  The top panel in this table contains 
estimations performed on ATT municipalities; the bottom panel contains results for estimations 
performed on treated municipalities. The reported R-squared is the estimated adjusted within-cell 
statistic. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, and clustered at the bank-year level. The 
sample period for all regressions is 2000-2010. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) -0.011 -0.011 -0.221*** -0.263***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.084) (0.086)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) × Domestic -0.048 -0.043 0.248*** 0.275***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.083) (0.092)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) -0.095* -0.095* -0.032 -0.014
(0.056) (0.055) (0.034) (0.025)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) × Domestic 0.104** 0.104** 0.028 0.012
(0.047) (0.046) (0.018) (0.014)
Muni × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni × Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Asset decile FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 25,071 25,071 32,326 29,133
R-squared 0.871 0.871 0.921 0.929
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) 0.008 0.006 -0.228*** -0.277***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.085) (0.088)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) × Domestic -0.079 -0.072 0.268*** 0.295***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.086) (0.094)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) -0.145 -0.142 -0.129 -0.074
(0.115) (0.115) (0.098) (0.079)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) × Domestic 0.168* 0.169* 0.057 0.026
(0.094) (0.093) (0.040) (0.035)
Muni × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni × Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Asset decile FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 20,880 20,880 27,181 24,674
R-squared 0.869 0.870 0.918 0.928
Robust standard errors in parentheses




Small banks Large banks




Table 6. Spatial robustness tests 
Panel A 
This table reports estimates of regressions of the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of branches of bank j in municipality i at time t 
on a five-year moving average of the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of treated branches of bank j and a five-year moving average 
of the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of “cartel relationships” held by bank j, and interactions of these independent variables 
with a  dummy for either “large bank” status (Panel A) or domestic majority equity ownership (Panel B). Estimations are performed on 
municipalities within a sequence of growing radii, centered on the geographical center of branch operations for bank j in year t. Importantly, 
these radii are nested: each successively larger category contains preceding ones. Estimated regression equations include municipality by 
year and municipality by bank fixed effects. The reported R-squared is the estimated adjusted within-cell statistic. Standard errors are 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Radii (mi) < 100 < 200 < 400 < 600 < 800 < 1000 < 2000
Large 0.075 0.043 0.036 0.022 0.013 0.005 0.002
(0.130) (0.076) (0.083) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) -0.050 -0.048*** -0.041** -0.042*** -0.042** -0.042** -0.042**
(0.035) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) 0.037 0.051** 0.046* 0.042* 0.042* 0.042* 0.044*
(0.036) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) × Large -0.008 -0.006 -0.022 -0.021 -0.019 -0.022 -0.025
(0.035) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) × Large -0.033* -0.028* -0.016 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.007
(0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Muni × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni × Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,739 14,255 36,373 47,740 53,532 56,209 57,666
R-squared 0.951 0.933 0.899 0.896 0.896 0.894 0.895
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(1+Branches)















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Radii (mi) < 100 < 200 < 400 < 600 < 800 < 1000 < 2000
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) -0.102** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.047*** -0.050*** -0.050***
(0.051) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) -0.030 -0.031 -0.037 -0.035 -0.037 -0.034 -0.034
(0.037) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) × Domestic 0.062 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.019
(0.056) (0.025) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) × Domestic 0.046** 0.054*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.079***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
Muni × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni × Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,739 14,255 36,373 47,740 36,373 56,209 57,666
R-squared 0.952 0.933 0.900 0.897 0.900 0.895 0.896
ln(1+Branches)





Table 7. Arellano-Bond regressions, multiple subsamples 
This panel reports estimates of regressions of the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of branches of bank j in municipality i at time t 
on a five-year moving average of the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of treated branches of bank j and a five-year moving average 
of the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of “cartel relationships” held by bank j. Model estimation is performed using the dynamic-
panel procedure of Arellano and Bond (1991). Column (1) reports results for an estimation performed on the ATT sample of municipalities; 
column (2) reports an estimation performed on the intersection of ATT municipalities and domestic banks; column (3) the estimation on a 
subsample defined by an ATT/large banks intersection, and column (4) ATT/large domestic banks. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-









(1) (2) (3) (4)
L1.ln(1+Branches) -0.139*** 0.079 -0.138*** -0.020
(0.016) (0.061) (0.017) (0.073)
ln MA 5 (1+BranchesTreated) -0.035*** -0.060*** -0.003 0.018***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
ln MA 5 (1+Relationships) -0.013*** 0.020*** -0.022*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sample ATT Domestic banks Large banks
Large domestic 
banks
Observations 46,285 29,820 28,463 15,069
Number of clusters (muni-bank) 18,375 12,511 9,913 6,248
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(1+Branches)








Table 8. Naïve dynamic-panel estimations 
 
This panel reports estimates of regressions of a binary indicator of cartel activity for cartel k in municipality i at time t on lags of itself and 
of a measure of prior exposure of cartel k to banks contemporaneously present in this municipality, in municipalities other than i. Columns 
(1)-(3) report specifications with five lags, and the lag structure is shortened as one moves from left to right across the table. Depending on 
the specification, estimations contain municipality by cartel, municipality by year, or cartel by year fixed effects. The reported R-squared is 
the estimated adjusted within-cell statistic. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, and clustered at the cartel-year level. The 
sample period for all regressions is 2000-2010. 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(t-1) 0.146*** 0.160*** 0.140*** 0.172*** 0.188*** 0.166*** 0.178*** 0.196*** 0.172***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
(t-2) 0.050* 0.060** 0.043 0.071*** 0.087*** 0.069*** 0.081*** 0.100*** 0.079***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
(t-3) 0.002 0.016 0.000 0.014 0.032 0.014
(0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
(t-4) -0.019 -0.007 -0.020
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
(t-5) -0.034 -0.009 -0.035
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
(t-1) 0.0003*** 0.0001** 0.0001* 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0002*** 0.0001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.0001)
(t-2) 0.000 0.000 0.0001** 0.000 0.000 0.0001* 0.000 0.0001* 0.0001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.00004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
(t-3) 0.0004* 0.0005*** 0.0003* 0.000 0.0003** 0.000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.000)
(t-4) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(t-5) -0.0005** -0.0003* -0.0004**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Muni × Cartel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni × Year FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Cartel × Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
54,490 54,490 54,490 65,750 65,750 65,750 71,110 71,110 71,110
0.507 0.456 0.516 0.492 0.438 0.501 0.490 0.435 0.499
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Observations
R-squared
Lag
Lag
Cartel activity (binary)
Cartel activity
Bank exposure
